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Working Paper
Battles and Diseases in the U.S. Civil War
Wars create short-term fluctuations in mortality. Belligerents might mitigate their own casualties with larger armies that hinder their opponent’s fighting ability. But diseases are frequent in wars and, thus, may reduce the benefits of larger armies. First, I analyze these competing mechanisms in a dynamic model of wartime attrition. Second, I calibrate the model using U.S. Civil War data and find that if the Union had fielded a 50%-larger army in 1861, Union casualties would have been marginally lower. The theory provides the insight for this quantitative result.
Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
How do war-related expenditures affect economically-relevant outcomes at a war’s conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces well the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents.
Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
The literature on war deals with finances, causes, or consequences. But, how do war-related expenditures affect economically-relevant outcomes at a war’s conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of GDP at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). The estimated model fits the data for the battle of Iwo Jima well. Analyzing data for the current Russo-Ukrainian war through the lenses of the model suggests that additional support to Ukraine could yield a ...
Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
The literature on war deals with finances, causes, or consequences. But, how do war-related expenditures affect economically-relevant outcomes at a war’s conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of GDP at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). The estimated model fits the data for the battle of Iwo Jima well. Analyzing data for the current Russo-Ukrainian war through the lenses of the model suggests that additional support to Ukraine could yield a ...
Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
A large literature is concerned with war finance, but there is little by way of understanding how war-related expenditures affect the economically-relevant outcomes of wars, e.g., prevailing side, duration, or destruction and casualties. I present a model of attrition in which I characterize the effects of resources on the outcomes of war for a military conclusion (when one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (when one side does not want to fight anymore). I discuss the role of GDP for both types of conclusion. I also analyze the mechanics of third-party support to a small ...
Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
A large literature is concerned with the consequences of war-related expenditures and how to finance them. Yet, there is little by way of understanding how expenditures affect the outcomes of wars, e.g., prevailing side, duration, or total destruction. I present a model of attrition in which I characterize the effects of resources on the outcomes of war for a military conclusion (when one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (when one side does not want to fight anymore). I discuss the role of GDP for both types of conclusions. I also analyze the mechanics of third-party ...