Working Paper
On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare
Abstract: A large literature is concerned with the consequences of war-related expenditures and how to finance them. Yet, there is little by way of understanding how expenditures affect the outcomes of wars, e.g., prevailing side, duration, or total destruction. I present a model of attrition in which I characterize the effects of resources on the outcomes of war for a military conclusion (when one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (when one side does not want to fight anymore). I discuss the role of GDP for both types of conclusions. I also analyze the mechanics of third-party support to a small country at war with a large one, e.g., Ukraine and Russia. Finally, I show that the model can fit actual battle data.
Keywords: war; attrition; military spending;
JEL Classification: E6; H56; N4;
https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2023.007
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 2023-04
Number: 2023-007
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