On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare

Vandenbroucke, Guillaume

doi:10.20955/wp.2023.007

Working Paper Revision

On the Economic Mechanics of Warfare

Abstract: How do war-related expenditures affect economically-relevant outcomes at a war’s conclusion (e.g., prevailing side, duration, and casualties)? I present a model of attrition and characterize the effects of resources at a military conclusion (one side cannot fight anymore) and a political conclusion (one side quits). I analyze the Pacific War through the lenses of the model both theoretically and empirically. I find that a parsimonious parameterization reproduces well the aggregate patterns of destruction, measured in ship tonnage, for both belligerents.

Keywords: war; attrition; military spending;

JEL Classification: E6; H56; N4;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2023.007