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Working Paper
Optimal Dynamic Capital Requirements and Implementable Capital Buffer Rules
We build a quantitatively relevant macroeconomic model with endogenous risk-taking. In our model, deposit insurance and limited liability can lead banks to make risky loans that are socially inefficient. This excessive risk-taking can be triggered by aggregate or sectoral shocks that reduce the return on safer loans. Excessive risk-taking can be avoided by raising bank capital requirements, but unnecessarily tight requirements lower welfare by limiting liquidity producing bank deposits. Consequently, optimal capital requirements are dynamic (or state contingent). We provide examples in which ...
Report
The FRBNY DSGE model
The goal of this paper is to present the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model developed and used at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The paper describes how the model works, how it is estimated, how it rationalizes past history, including the Great Recession, and how it is used for forecasting and policy analysis.
Report
Rare shocks, great recessions
We estimate a DSGE model where rare large shocks can occur, by replacing the commonly used Gaussian assumption with a Student?s t distribution. Results from the Smets and Wouters (2007) model estimated on the usual set of macroeconomic time series over the 1964-2011 period indicate that 1) the Student?s t specification is strongly favored by the data even when we allow for low-frequency variation in the volatility of the shocks and 2) the estimated degrees of freedom are quite low for several shocks that drive U.S. business cycles, implying an important role for rare large shocks. This result ...
Discussion Paper
An Assessment of the FRBNY DSGE Model's Real-Time Forecasts, 2010-2013
In this blog post, we discuss the real-time forecasts from the FRBNY DSGE model starting from March 2010, when we began producing policy forecasts, and provide an assessment of the model’s overall forecasting accuracy. The forecasts have been produced roughly eight times a year, about two weeks before each Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, and have all been released in internal documents. Note that the FRBNY DSGE forecast is not the official FRBNY staff forecast and that the specification of the model has evolved over time, reflecting attempts to capture important features of ...
Report
On the Validity of Classical and Bayesian DSGE-Based Inference
This paper studies large sample classical and Bayesian inference in a prototypical linear DSGE model and demonstrates that inference on the structural parameters based on a Gaussian likelihood is unaffected by departures from Gaussianity of the structural shocks. This surprising result is due to a cancellation in the asymptotic variance resulting into a generalized information equality for the block corresponding to the structural parameters. The underlying reason for the cancellation is the certainty equivalence property of the linear rational expectation model.The main implication of this ...
Discussion Paper
Forecasting the Great Recession: DSGE vs. Blue Chip
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have been trashed, bashed, and abused during the Great Recession and after. One of the many reasons for the bashing was the models’ alleged inability to forecast the recession itself. Oddly enough, there’s little evidence on the forecasting performance of DSGE models during this turbulent period. In the paper “DSGE Model-Based Forecasting,” prepared for Elsevier’s Handbook of Economic Forecasting, two of us (Del Negro and Schorfheide), with the help of the third (Herbst), provide some of this evidence. This post shares some of our ...
Working Paper
Macroeconomic Effects of Banking Sector Losses across Structural Models
The macro spillover effects of capital shortfalls in the financial intermediation sector are compared across five dynamic equilibrium models for policy analysis. Although all the models considered share antecedents and a methodological core, each model emphasizes different transmission channels. This approach delivers "model-based confidence intervals" for the real and financial effects of shocks originating in the financial sector. The range of outcomes predicted by the five models is only slightly narrower than confidence intervals produced by simple vector autoregressions.
Working Paper
The Effects of Foreign Shocks when Interest Rates are at Zero
In a two-country DSGE model, the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. This result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the United States. Departing from many of the existing closed-economy models, the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously. Adverse foreign shocks can extend the duration of the trap, implying more contractionary effects for the home country. The home economy is more vulnerable to adverse foreign shocks if ...
Working Paper
The US Banks’ Balance Sheet Transmission Channel of Oil Price Shocks
We document the existence of a quantitative relevant banks' balance-sheet transmission channel of oil price shocks by estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking and oil sectors. The associated amplification mechanism implies that those shocks explain a non-negligible share of US GDP growth fluctuations, up to 17 percent, instead of 6 percent absent the banking sector. Also, they mitigated the severity of the Great Recession’s trough. GDP growth would have been 2.48 percentage points more negative in 2008Q4 without the beneficial effect of low oil prices. The ...
Report
The New York Fed DSGE Model: A Post-Covid Assessment
We document the real-time forecasting performance for output and inflation of the New York Fed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model since 2011. We find the DSGE's accuracy to be comparable to that of private forecasters before Covid, but somewhat worse thereafter.