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Two areas of present concern: the economic outlook and the pathology of Too-Big-to-Fail (with reference to Errol Flynn, Johnny Mercer, Gary Stern, and Voltaire)

Remarks before the Senior Delegates' Roundtable of the Fixed Income Forum, Carlsbad, California, July 23, 2009. ; "A lot of former negatives are being eliminated. We are seeing changes from negative impulses to slightly positive ones. This accentuates the positive in the aggregate. We probably have the beginnings of a faint recovery."
Speeches and Essays , Paper 8

Conference Paper
The financial crisis and global policy reforms

Proceedings , Issue Oct , Pages 299-334

Some thoughts on the economy and financial regulatory reform: a speech at the Economics Club of Pittsburgh, November 13, 2008

Presented by Charles I. Plosser, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, at the Economics Club of Pittsburgh, November 13, 2008
Speech , Paper 21

Containing (or restraining) systemic risk: the need to not fail on 'Too Big to Fail' (with reference to Margaret Thatcher, Geoffrey Howe, Irving Kristol, Joe Nocera, Bastiat, Nietzsche, Mencken and Sandy Weill)

Remarks before the Market News International Seminar, New York, N.Y., June 6, 2011 ; "Postcrisis, the large institutions are even larger: The top 10 now account for 64 percent of assets, up from 58 percent before the crisis and substantially higher than the 25 percent they accounted for in 1990. In effect, more prudent and better-managed banks have been denied the market share that would have been theirs if mismanaged big banks had been allowed to go out of business.
Speeches and Essays , Paper 90

Discussion Paper
Introduction to a Series on Market Liquidity: Part 2

Market participants and policymakers have raised concerns about the potential adverse effects of financial regulation on market liquidity?the ability to buy and sell securities quickly, at any time, at minimal cost. Market liquidity supports the efficient allocation of capital through financial markets, which is a catalyst for sustainable economic growth. Changes in market liquidity, whether due to regulation or other forces, are therefore of great interest to policymakers and market participants alike.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20151005

Working Paper
Efficient bailouts?

This paper develops a non-linear DSGE model to assess the interaction between ex-post interventions in credit markets and the build-up of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. The optimal policy requires, in general, a mix of ex-post intervention and ex-ante prudential policy. We also analyze the effects of bailouts on financial stability and welfare in the absence of ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 133

Discussion Paper
Consumer testing informs policy: overdraft regulation as a case study

In November 2009, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System issued regulations that protect consumers from being charged certain fees when, under a discretionary overdraft service, financial institutions pay transactions from a deposit account that contains insufficient funds. Under the regulations, consumers must receive notices that explain any discretionary overdraft services offered to them by their bank. In addition, consumers may not be charged overdraft fees for ATM or one-time debit transactions unless they have opted in to this service. During the rulemaking process, the ...
Consumer Finance Institute discussion papers , Paper 10-03

Working Paper
A primer on market discipline and governance of financial institutions for those in a state of shocked disbelief

Self regulation encouraged by market discipline constitutes a key component of Basel II?s third pillar. But high-risk investment strategies may maximize the expected value of some banks. In these cases, does market discipline encourage risk-taking that undermines bank stability in economic downturns? This paper reviews the literature on corporate control in banking. It reviews the techniques for assessing bank performance, interaction between regulation and the federal safety net with market discipline on risk-taking incentives and stability, and sources of market discipline, including ...
Working Papers , Paper 12-13

Plosser defines key issues in financial reform : remarks to the Joint Economic Committee Staff Meeting, U.S. Congress, May 5, 2010.

In remarks at a meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, President Charles I. Plosser discussed the importance of implementing regulatory changes that would help to avert financial crises in the future.
Speech , Paper 38

Journal Article
Taming the credit cycle by limiting high-risk lending

Reformers should review the loan-to-value guidelines for real estate lending, toughen them up where necessary and, most important, put the force of law behind them.
Economic Letter , Volume 4



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