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Keywords:Deposit insurance 

Working Paper
Fixed-premium deposit insurance and international credit crunches

We introduce a monopolistically-competitive model of foreign lending in which both explicit and implicit fixed-premium deposit insurance increase the degree to which bank participation in relending to problem debtors falls below its globally optimal level. This provides a channel for fixed-premium deposit insurance to inhibit credit extension in bad states, resulting in an increase in the expected default percentage and an increase in the expected burden on the deposit insurance institution.
Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory , Paper 94-19

Journal Article
Systemic risk and deposit insurance premiums

Professor Viral Acharya of the London Business School and New York University collaborates with New York Fed economists Joo Santos and Tanju Yorulmazer to analyze various ways to incorporate systemic risk into deposit insurance premiums. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.
Economic Policy Review , Volume 16 , Issue Aug , Pages 89-99

Conference Paper
Changing incentives facing financial-services regulators

Proceedings

Journal Article
Credit spreads and subordinated debt

Stock and bond prices contain all sorts of information about investors? beliefs and expectations. For example, the interest rate on bank debt not insured by the FDIC has information about the health of the banks issuing the debt. Unfortunately, difficulties in extracting information from these subordinated debt prices reduces the information? usefulness to regulators and policymakers.
Economic Commentary , Issue Mar

Conference Paper
Depositor preference legislation and failed banks' resolution costs

Proceedings , Paper 591

Working Paper
Adverse selection and competing deposit insurance systems in pre-depression Texas

In 1910, Texas instituted a highly unique deposit insurance program for its state chartered banks consisting of two separate plans: the depositors guaranty fund, similar in operation to the deposit insurance schemes adopted in several other states; and the depositors bond security system, which required the procurement of a privately issued insurance policy. We hypothesize that the provision of a choice in funds led to risk-sorting among the banks, with the relatively conservative institutions opting for the comparatively rigorous bond security system. Employing a probit model with ...
Financial Industry Studies Working Paper , Paper 97-4

Conference Paper
A contracting-theory intepretation of the origins of Federal deposit insurance

Proceedings , Issue Aug , Pages 573-595

Journal Article
The effects of legislating prompt corrective action on the Bank Insurance Fund

Review , Issue Jul , Pages 3-22

Journal Article
Can deposit insurance increase the risk of bank failure? Some historical evidence

Review , Issue May , Pages 57-71

Conference Paper
Regulatory taxes, investment and financing decisions for insured banks

Proceedings , Paper 477

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Thomson, James B. 19 items

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