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Keywords:Altruism 

Working Paper
Altruism, borrowing constraints, and social security
An examination of how intergenerational altruism and borrowing constraints shape the interest rate, savings, and welfare response to funded and unfunded Social Security programs.
AUTHORS: Davis, Steven J.; Altig, David E.
DATE: 1989

Working Paper
How much is a friend worth?: directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social networks
We conduct field experiments in a large real-world social network to examine why decision-makers treat their friends more generously than strangers. Subjects are asked to divide a surplus between themselves and named partners at varying social distances, but only one of these decisions is implemented. We decompose altruistic preferences into baseline altruism towards strangers, and directed altruism towards friends. In order to separate the motives that are altruistic from the ones that anticipate a future interaction or repayment, we implement an anonymous treatment in which neither player is told at the end of the experiment which decision was selected for payment, and a non-anonymous treatment where both players are told the outcome. Moreover, in order to distinguish between different future interaction channels?including signaling one?s propensity to be generous and enforced reciprocity, where the decision-maker grants the partner a favor because she expects it to be repaid in the future?the experiments include games where transfers both increase and decrease social surplus. We find that decision-makers vary widely in their baseline altruism, but pass at least 50 percent more surplus to friends as opposed to strangers when decision-making is anonymous. Under non-anonymity, transfers to friends increase by an extra 24 percent relative to strangers, but only in games where transfers increase social surplus. This effect increases with the density of the social network structure between both players. Our findings are well explained by enforced reciprocity, but not by signaling or preference-based reciprocity. We also find that partners? expectations are well attuned to directed altruism, but that they completely ignore the decision-makers? baseline altruism. Partners with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism and, therefore, are treated better by their friends.
AUTHORS: Leider, Stephen; Rosenblat, Tanya; Do, Quoc-Anh; Markus M. Möbius
DATE: 2007

Working Paper
Active decisions and pro-social behavior
In this paper, we propose a decision framework where people are individually asked to either actively consent to or dissent from some pro-social behavior. We hypothesize that confronting individuals with the choice of whether to engage in a specific pro-social behavior contributes to the formation of issue-specific altruistic preferences, while simultaneously involving a commitment. The hypothesis is tested in a large-scale field experiment on blood donations. We find that this ?active-decision? intervention substantially increases the actual donation behavior of people who had not fully formed preferences beforehand.
AUTHORS: Goette, Lorenz; Zehnder, Michael; Stutzer, Alois
DATE: 2007

Working Paper
Social networks and vaccination decisions
We combine information on social networks with medical records and survey data in order to examine how friends affect one?s decision to get vaccinated against the flu. The random assignment of undergraduates to residential halls at a large private university allows us to estimate how peer effects influence health beliefs and vaccination choices. Our results indicate that social exposure to medical information raises people?s perceptions of the benefits of immunization. The average student?s belief about the vaccine?s health value increases by $5.00 when an additional 10 percent of her friends are assigned to residences that host inoculation clinics. Among students with no recent flu experience, a 10 percent rise in the number of friends living in residences with clinics raises cumulative valuations of the vaccine by $10.92, with 85 percent of this increase attributable to heightened perceptions about the medical benefits of immunization. We also find evidence of positive peer effects on individuals? vaccination decisions. A student becomes up to 8.3 percentage points more likely to get immunized if an additional 10 percent of her friends receive flu shots. Furthermore, the excess clustering of friends at inoculation clinics suggests that students coordinate their vaccination decisions with their friends.
AUTHORS: Rao, Neel; Rosenblat, Tanya; Markus M. Möbius
DATE: 2007

Working Paper
Games with synergistic preferences
In economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the "synergies" between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.
AUTHORS: Jamison, Julian
DATE: 2011

Working Paper
Minimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game
I suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
AUTHORS: Rotemberg, Julio J.
DATE: 2006

Working Paper
Blood donations and incentives: evidence from a field experiment
There is a longstanding concern that material incentives might undermine prosocial motivation, leading to a decrease in blood donations rather than an increase. This paper provides an empirical test of how material incentives affect blood donations in a large-scale field experiment spanning three months and involving more than 10,000 previous donors. We examine two types of incentive: a lottery ticket and a free cholesterol test. Lottery tickets significantly increase donations, in particular among less motivated donors. The cholesterol test leads to no discernable impact on usable blood donations. If anything, it creates a small negative selection effect in terms of donations that must be discarded.
AUTHORS: Stutzer, Alois; Goette, Lorenz
DATE: 2008

Working Paper
Estate taxation with warm-glow altruism
This article examines the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with warm-glow altruism (utility interdependence) and heterogeneous individuals. We propose a new efficiency concept, D-efficiency, that considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: donors cannot bequeath to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint, we show that the market equilibrium is not socially efficient. The efficient level of bequest transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-off between minimizing distortions and eliminating external effects. The implied tax policy differs from Pigovian taxation since the government's ability to correct the external effects is limited. Finally, we show that the efficiency-equity trade-off does not affect the qualitative features of the optimal distortionary fiscal policy.
AUTHORS: Garriga, Carlos; Sanchez-Losada, Fernando
DATE: 2009

Discussion Paper
Risk-sharing, altruism, and the factor structure of consumption
We consider four models of consumption that differ with respect to efficient risk-sharing and altruism. They range from complete markets with altruism to family risk-sharing. We use a matched sample of parents and independent children available from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to discriminate between the four models. Our testing procedure is designed to deal with the set of observed independent children being endogenously selected. The combined hypothesis of complete markets and altruism can be decisively rejected, while we fail to reject altruism and hence family risk-sharing for a subset of families.
AUTHORS: Kotlikoff, Laurence J.; Hayashi, Fumio; Altonji, Joseph
DATE: 1991

Discussion Paper
New evidence on altruism: a study of TIAA-CREF retirees
Economists make extensive use of two separate descriptions of private saving behavior: the life-cycle (or overlapping generations) model, and models with intergenerational altruism. Analysis of the two frameworks is quite different, as are many of the long-run policy implications. This paper looks at evidence, at the microeconomic level, for and against altruism as a principal determinant of private wealth holdings. The database is new: this paper uses a sample of annuitants in the TIAA-CREF retirement system. We employ a combination of qualitative and quantitative information. Results are: (i) one-half or more of the sample appears altruistically motivated. And (ii) saving for intentional bequestsamounting to about $350,000$400,000 per family (at retirement) for about half the sampleseems to account for about 25 percent of average lifetime net worth for the whole group. If the definition of parental transfers is broadened to include spending on higher education for children and gifts (rather than just estates), the contribution of intentional transfers to lifetime average net worth climbs to 3540 percentin our sample.
AUTHORS: Juster, F. Thomas; Laitner, John
DATE: 1993

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