Search Results
Working Paper
Wage Setting Under Targeted Search
When setting initial compensation, some firms set a fixed, non-negotiable wage while others bargain. In this paper we propose a parsimonious search and matching model with two sided heterogeneity, where the choice of wage-setting protocol, wages, search intensity, and degree of randomness in matching are endogenous. We find that posting and bargaining coexist as wage-setting protocols if there is sufficient heterogeneity in match quality, search costs, or market tightness and that labor market tightness and relative costs of search play a key role in the choice of the wage-setting mechanism. ...
Working Paper
Training and Search on the Job
The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers? careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment con- tracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type. Because matches do not internalize the specific capital loss from employer changes, specific human capital can be over-accumulated, more so in low type firms. While validating the Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) mechanisms, the analysis ...
Working Paper
Wage Setting Under Targeted Search
When setting initial compensation, some firms set a fixed, non-negotiable wage while others bargain. In this paper we propose a parsimonious search and matching model with two sided heterogeneity, where the choice of wage-setting protocol, wages, search intensity, and degree of randomness in matching are endogenous. We find that posting and bargaining coexist as wage-setting protocols if there is sufficient heterogeneity in match quality, search costs, or market tightness and that labor market tightness and relative costs of search play a key role in the choice of the wage-setting mechanism. ...
Working Paper
Wage Setting Under Targeted Search
When setting initial compensation some firms set a fixed non-negotiable wage while others bargain. In this paper we propose a parsimonious search and matching model with two sided heterogeneity, where search intensity and the degree of randomness in matching are endogenous, and firms decide whether to bargain or post wages. We study the implications of heterogeneous search costs and market tightness on the choice of the wage setting mechanism, as well as the relationship between bargaining prevalence and wage level, residual wage dispersion, and labor market tightness. We find that bargaining ...
Working Paper
Network Search: Climbing the Job Ladder Faster
We introduce an irregular network structure into a model of frictional, on-the-job search in which workers find jobs through their network connections or directly from firms. We show that jobs found through network search have wages that stochastically dominate those found through direct contact. Because we consider irregular networks, heterogeneity in the worker's position within the network leads to heterogeneity in wage and employment dynamics: better connected workers climb the job ladder faster and do not fall off it as far. These workers also pass along higher quality referrals, which ...
Working Paper
Wage Setting Under Targeted Search
When setting initial compensation, some firms set a fixed, non-negotiable wage while others bargain. In this paper we propose a parsimonious search and matching model with two sided heterogeneity, where the choice of wage-settingprotocol, wages, search intensity, and degree of randomness in matching are endogenous. We find that posting and bargaining coexist as wage-setting protocols if there is sufficient heterogeneity in match quality, search costs, or market tightness and that labor market tightness and relative costs of search play a key role in the optimal choice of the wage-setting ...