Working Paper

Wage Setting Under Targeted Search


Abstract: When setting initial compensation some firms set a fixed non-negotiable wage while others bargain. In this paper we propose a parsimonious search and matching model with two sided heterogeneity, where search intensity and the degree of randomness in matching are endogenous, and firms decide whether to bargain or post wages. We study the implications of heterogeneous search costs and market tightness on the choice of the wage setting mechanism, as well as the relationship between bargaining prevalence and wage level, residual wage dispersion, and labor market tightness. We find that bargaining prevalence is positively correlated with wages, residual wage dispersion, and labor market tightness, both in the model and in the data.

Keywords: Wage bargaining; wage posting; wage dispersion;

JEL Classification: E24; J3; J41;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2020.041

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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Part of Series: Working Papers

Publication Date: 2020-10

Number: 2020-041