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Keywords:systemic risk OR Systemic risk OR Systemic Risk 

Journal Article
Systemic risk and deposit insurance premiums

Professor Viral Acharya of the London Business School and New York University collaborates with New York Fed economists Joo Santos and Tanju Yorulmazer to analyze various ways to incorporate systemic risk into deposit insurance premiums. Presented at "Central Bank Liquidity Tools and Perspectives on Regulatory Reform" a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, February 19-20, 2009.
Economic Policy Review , Volume 16 , Issue Aug , Pages 89-99

Working Paper
How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systemically important?

This paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the merger boom of 1991-2004, the authors find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. They estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the eight merger deals that brought the organizations to over $100 billion in assets. In addition, the authors find that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these deals. Their estimated TBTF subsidy is large enough ...
Working Papers , Paper 09-34

Discussion Paper
Are Asset Managers Vulnerable to Fire Sales?

According to conventional wisdom, an open-ended investment fund that has a floating net asset value (NAV) and no leverage will never experience a run and hence never have to fire-sell assets. In that view, a decline in the value of the fund’s assets will just lead to a commensurate and automatic decline in the fund’s equity—end of story. In this post, we argue that the conventional wisdom is incomplete and then explore some of the systemic risk consequences of investment funds’ vulnerabilities to fire-sale spillovers.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20160218

Speech
Plosser defines key issues in financial reform : remarks to the Joint Economic Committee Staff Meeting, U.S. Congress, May 5, 2010.

In remarks at a meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, President Charles I. Plosser discussed the importance of implementing regulatory changes that would help to avert financial crises in the future.
Speech , Paper 38

Speech
Factors affecting efforts to limit payments to AIG counterparties

Testimony before the Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of Representatives.
Speech , Paper 13

Report
Repo and securities lending

We provide an overview of the data required to monitor repo and securities lending markets for the purposes of informing policymakers and researchers about firm-level and systemic risk. We start by explaining the functioning of these markets and argue that it is crucial to understand the institutional arrangements. Data collection is currently incomplete. A comprehensive collection would include, at a minimum, six characteristics of repo and securities lending trades at the firm level: principal amount, interest rate, collateral type, haircut, tenor, and counterparty.
Staff Reports , Paper 529

Discussion Paper
Banks and Nonbanks Are Not Separate, but Interwoven

In our previous post, we documented the significant growth of nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs) over the past decade, but also argued for and showed evidence of NBFIs’ dependence on banks for funding and liquidity support. In this post, we explain that the observed growth of NBFIs reflects banks optimally changing their business models in response to factors such as regulation, rather than banks stepping away from lending and risky activities and being substituted by NBFIs. The enduring bank-NBFI nexus is best understood as an ever-evolving transformation of risks that were hitherto ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20240618

Working Paper
Systemic risk contributions

We adopt a systemic risk indicator measured by the price of insurance against systemic financial distress and assess individual banks' marginal contributions to the systemic risk. The methodology is applied using publicly available data to the 19 bank holding companies covered by the U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), with the systemic risk indicator peaking around $1.1 trillion in March 2009. Our systemic risk contribution measure shows interesting similarity to and divergence from the SCAP expected loss measure. In general, we find that a bank's contribution to the systemic ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2011-08

Speech
Liquidity and systemic risk.

Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond's 2008 Credit Markets Symposium, The Changing Business of Banking, Charlotte, North Carolina, April 18, 2008
Speech , Paper 12

Speech
Welcoming remarks : financial interdependence in the world's post-crisis capital markets : a speech for the 2010 Global Conference Series (Part III), March 3, 2010.

Presented by Charles I. Plosser, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia> Financial Interdependence in the World's Post-Crisis Capital Markets, Presented by the Global Interdependence Center (GIC) in partnership with the Philadelphia Council for Business Economics, the CFA Society of Philadelphia, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2010 Global Conference Series (Part III) March 3, 2010.
Speech , Paper 35

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