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Report
Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured? An Experimental Investigation
A core responsibility of a central bank is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its Discount Window. The Discount Window, however, has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we study experimentally how such stigma can be cured. We find that, once a Discount Window facility is stigmatized, removing stigma is difficult. This result is consistent with the Federal Reserve’s experiences which have been unsuccessful at removing the stigma associated with its Discount Window.
Speech
Discussion of “Evaluating Monetary Policy Operational Frameworks” by Ulrich Bindseil: remarks at the 2016 Economic Policy Symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming
Remarks at the 2016 Economic Policy Symposium at Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
Discussion Paper
Is There Stigma to Discount Window Borrowing?
The Federal Reserve employs the discount window (DW) to provide funding to fundamentally solvent but illiquid banks (see the March 30 post “Why Do Central Banks Have Discount Windows?”). Historically, however, there has been a low level of DW use by banks, even when they are faced with severe liquidity shortages, raising the possibility of a stigma attached to DW borrowing. If DW stigma exists, it is likely to inhibit the Fed’s ability to act as lender of last resort and prod banks to turn to more expensive sources of financing when they can least afford it. In this post, we provide ...
Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Feel Discount Window Stigma?
Even when banks face acute liquidity shortages, they often appear reluctant to borrow at the New York Fed’s discount window (DW) out of concern that such borrowing may be interpreted as a sign of financial weakness. This phenomenon is often called “DW stigma.” In this post, we explore possible reasons why banks may feel such stigma.
Discussion Paper
The Recent Rise in Discount Window Borrowing
The Federal Reserve’s primary credit program—offered through its “discount window” (DW)—provides temporary short-term funding to fundamentally sound banks. Historically, loan activity has been low during normal times due to a variety of factors, including the DW’s status as a back-up source of liquidity with a relatively punitive interest rate, the stigma attached to DW borrowing from the central bank, and, since 2008, elevated levels of reserves in the banking system. However, beginning in 2022, DW borrowing under the primary credit program increased notably in comparison to past ...
Discussion Paper
Which Dealers Borrowed from the Fed’s Lender-of-Last-Resort Facilities?
During the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Fed established lending facilities designed to improve market functioning by providing liquidity to nondepository financial institutions—the first lending targeted to this group since the 1930s. What was the financial condition of the dealers that borrowed from these facilities? Were they healthy institutions behaving opportunistically or were they genuinely distressed? In published research, we find that dealers in a weaker financial condition were more likely to participate than healthier ones and tended to borrow more. Our findings reinforce the ...
Discussion Paper
Discount Window Stigma After the Global Financial Crisis
The rapidity of deposit outflows during the March 2023 banking run highlights the important role that the Federal Reserve’s discount window should play in strengthening financial stability. A lack of borrowing, however, has plagued the discount window for decades, likely due to banks’ concerns about stigma—that is, their unwillingness to borrow at the discount window because it may be viewed as a sign of financial weakness in the eyes of regulators and market participants. The discount window has been reformed several times to alleviate this problem. Although the presence of stigma ...
Report
Discount window stigma during the 2007-2008 financial crisis
We provide empirical evidence for the existence, magnitude, and economic cost of stigma associated with banks borrowing from the Federal Reserve?s Discount Window (DW) during the 2007-08 financial crisis. We find that banks were willing to pay a premium of around 44 basis points across funding sources (126 basis points after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers) to avoid borrowing from the DW. DW stigma is economically relevant as it increased some banks? borrowing cost by 32 basis points of their pre-tax return on assets (ROA) during the crisis. The implications of our results for the provision ...
Report
Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last resort facilities
We examine the financial conditions of dealers that participated in two of the Federal Reserve?s lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities--the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)--that provided liquidity against a range of assets during 2008-09. Dealers with lower equity returns and greater leverage prior to borrowing from the facilities were more likely to participate in the programs, borrow more, and--in the case of the TSLF--at higher bidding rates. Dealers with less liquid collateral on their balance sheets before the facilities were ...
Discussion Paper
Can Discount Window Stigma Be Cured?
One of the core responsibilities of central banks is to act as “lender of last resort” to the financial system. In the U.S., the Federal Reserve has been operating as a lender of last resort through its “discount window” (DW) for more than a century. Historically, however, the DW has been plagued by stigma—banks’ reluctance to use the DW, even for benign reasons, out of concerns that it could be interpreted as a sign of financial weakness. In this post, we report on new research showing that once a DW facility is stigmatized, removing that stigma is difficult.