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Working Paper
What we don’t know doesn’t hurt us: rational inattention and the permanent income hypothesis in general equilibrium
This paper derives the general equilibrium effects of rational inattention (or RI; Sims 2003,2010) in a model of incomplete income insurance (Huggett 1993, Wang 2003). We show that,under the assumption of CARA utility with Gaussian shocks, the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) arises in steady state equilibrium due to a balancing of precautionary savings and impatience. We then explore how RI affects the equilibrium joint dynamics of consumption, income and wealth, and find that elastic attention can make the model fit the data better. We finally show that the welfare costs of incomplete ...
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Coarse Pricing Policies
The puzzling behavior of inflation in the Great Recession and its aftermath has increased the need to better understand the constraints that firms face when setting prices. Using new data and theory, I demonstrate that each firm's choice of how much information to acquire to set prices determines aggregate price dynamics through the patterns of pricing at the micro level, and through the large heterogeneity in pricing policies across firms. Viewed through this lens, the behavior of prices in recent years becomes less puzzling, as firms endogenously adjust their information acquisition ...
Working Paper
Asymmetric firm dynamics under rational inattention
We study the link between business failures, markups and business cycle asymmetry in the U.S. economy with a model of optimal firm exit under rational inattention. We show that the model's predictions of lagged, counter-cyclical and positively skewed markups together with counter-cyclical exit rates are consistent with the empirical evidence. Moreover, our model uncovers a new mechanism that links information processing with the business cycle. It predicts counter-cyclical attention to economic conditions consistent with survey evidence.
Working Paper
Mechanics of Linear Quadratic Gaussian Rational Inattention Tracking Problems
This paper presents a general framework for constructing and solving the multivariate static linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) rational inattention tracking problem. We interpret the nature of the solution and the implied action of the agent, and we construct representations that formalize how the agent processes data. We apply this infrastructure to the rational inattention price-setting problem, confirming the result that a conditional response to economics shocks is possible, but casting doubt on a common assumption made in the literature. We show that multiple equilibria and a social cost ...
Working Paper
Are Real Assets Owners Less Averse to Inflation? Evidence from Consumer Sentiments and Inflation Expectations
Using data from the University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, we document a significant negative association between consumer sentiment and inflation expectations, controlling for prevailing inflation in the economy. We further show that consumer sentiments of homeowners and stockowners are more sensitive to expected inflation than those of other consumers, a disparity at odds with the notion that owning such assets provides hedges against inflation. Leveraging data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations, we find three factors that help account for this difference. First, assets owners' ...
Working Paper
What Can Measured Beliefs Tell Us About Monetary Non-Neutrality?
This paper studies how measured beliefs can be used to identify monetary non-neutrality. In a general equilibrium model with both nominal rigidities and endogenous information acquisition, we analytically characterize firms’ optimal dynamic information policies and how their beliefs affect monetary non-neutrality. We then show that data on the cross-sectional distributions of uncertainty and pricing durations are both necessary and sufficient to identify monetary non-neutrality. Finally, implementing our approach in New Zealand survey data, we find that informational frictions approximately ...
Working Paper
Elastic attention, risk sharing, and international comovements
In this paper we examine the effects of elastic information-processing capacity (or optimal inattention) proposed in Sims (2010) on international consumption and income correlations in a tractable small open economy (SOE) model with exogenous income processes. We find that in the presence of capital mobility in financial markets, optimal inattention due to fixed information-processing cost lowers the international consumption correlations by generating heterogeneous consumption adjustments to income shocks across countries facing different macroeconomic uncertainty. In addition, we show that ...
Working Paper
Attention and Fluctuations in Macroeconomic Uncertainty
I show that economic agents’ attention to macroeconomic events can increase macroeconomic uncertainty during recessions. Agents face uncertainty about the aggregate state of the economy, receive dispersed information about it, and can pay attention to acquire more information. When the economy is in a bad state, agents choose to pay more attention, and their collective response increases three common measures of uncertainty: (i) aggregate output volatility, (ii) forecast dispersion about output, and (iii) subjective uncertainty about output. Uncertainty driven by agents’ attention implies ...
Working Paper
Attention and Fluctuations in Macroeconomic Uncertainty
This paper studies a dispersed information economy in which agents can exert costly attention to learn about an unknown aggregate state of the economy. Under certain conditions, attention and four measures of uncertainty are countercyclical: Agents pay more attention when they expect the economy to be in a bad state, and their reaction generates higher (i) aggregate output volatility, (ii) cross-sectional output dispersion, (iii) forecast dispersion about aggregate output, and (iv) subjective uncertainty about aggregate output faced by each agent. All these phenomena are prominent features of ...
Working Paper
Rational Inattention via Ignorance Equivalence
We introduce the concept of the ignorance equivalent to effectively summarize the payoff possibilities in a finite Rational Inattention problem. The ignorance equivalent is a unique fictitious action that is weakly preferable to all existing learning strategies and yet generates no new profitable learning opportunities when added to the menu of choices. We fully characterize the relationship between the ignorance equivalent and the optimal learning strategies. Agents with heterogeneous priors self-select their own ignorance equivalent, which gives rise to an expected-utility analogue of the ...