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Report
Discussion of “Systemic Risk and the Solvency-Liquidity Nexus of Banks”
Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks? solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point toward a tight interaction between solvency and liquidity risk over time. My comments are threefold. First, I suggest improving the identification of shocks in Pierret?s vector autoregressive setup. Second, I caution against using the quantitative results as the basis for setting policy. Third, I recommend ...
Report
Liquidity, Collateral Quality, and Negative Interest Rate
We analyze how banks manage liquidity between cash and marketable securities and its impact on the refinancing of projects subject to a liquidity shock. Securities can be pledged as collateral to acquire additional cash but are an imperfect hedge because their quality is uncertain. We show that banks may hold too much or too little cash in equilibrium compared to the first-best level, depending on the dispersion of securities value. Furthermore, the equilibrium relationship between the dispersion and banks cash holding is non-monotonous. We use this framework to assess the impact of liquidity ...
Discussion Paper
How Liquidity Standards Can Improve Lending of Last Resort Policies
Prior to the Great Recession, the focus of bank regulation was on bank capital with little consensus about the need for liquidity regulation. This view was in contrast with an existing body of academic research that pointed to inefficiencies in environments with strictly private provision of liquidity, via either interbank markets or credit line agreements. In spite of theoretical results pointing to the possible benefits of liquidity regulation for reducing fire sales in crises or the risk of panics due to coordination failures, a common view was that its costs might exceed its benefits, ...
Report
The effect of monetary policy on bank wholesale funding
We study how monetary policy affects the funding composition of the banking sector. When monetary tightening reduces the retail deposit supply, banks try to substitute the deposit outflows with wholesale funding to smooth their lending. Banks have varying degrees of accessibility to wholesale funding owing to financial frictions, hence large banks, or those with a greater reliance on wholesale funding, increase their wholesale funding more. Consequently, monetary tightening increases both the reliance on and the concentration of wholesale funding within the banking sector. Our findings also ...
Working Paper
Liquidity Requirements and the Interbank Loan Market: An Experimental Investigation
We develop a stylized interbank market environment and use it to evaluate with experimental methods the effects of liquidity requirements. Baseline and liquidity-regulated regimes are analyzed in a simple shock environment, which features a single idiosyncratic shock, and in a compound shock environment, in which the idiosyncratic shock is followed by a randomly occurring second-stage shock. Interbank trading of the illiquid asset follows each shock. In the simple shock environment, we find that liquidity regulations reduce the incidence of bankruptcies, but at a large loss of investment ...
Working Paper
The Interplay Among Financial Regulations, Resilience, and Growth
Interconnectedness has been an important source of market failures, leading to the recent financial crisis. Large financial institutions tend to have similar exposures and thus exert externalities on each other through various mechanisms. Regulators have responded by putting more regulations in place with many layers of regulatory complexity, leading to ambiguity and market manipulation. Mispricing risk in complex models and arbitrage opportunities through regulatory loopholes have provided incentives for certain activities to become more concentrated in regulated entities and for other ...
Working Paper
Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis
During the 2007-09 financial crisis, there were severe reductions in the liquidity of financial markets, runs on the shadow banking system, and destabilizing defaults and near-defaults of major financial institutions. In response, the Federal Reserve, in its role as lender of last resort (LOLR), injected extraordinary amounts of liquidity. In the aftermath, lawmakers and regulators have taken steps to reduce the likelihood that such lending would be required in the future, including the introduction of liquidity regulations. These changes were motivated in part by the argument that central ...
Working Paper
Bank regulation under fire sale externalities
This paper examines the optimal design of and interaction between capital and liquidity regulations in a model characterized by fire sale externalities. In the model, banks can insure against potential liquidity shocks by hoarding sufficient precautionary liquid assets. However, it is never optimal to fully insure, so realized liquidity shocks trigger an asset fire sale. Banks, not internalizing the fire sale externality, overinvest in the risky asset and underinvest in the liquid asset in the unregulated competitive equilibrium. Capital requirements can lead to less severe fire sales by ...
Report
Liquidity policies and systemic risk
The growth of wholesale-funded credit intermediation has motivated liquidity regulations. We analyze a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which liquidity and capital regulations interact with the supply of risk-free assets. In the model, the endogenously time-varying tightness of liquidity and capital constraints generates intermediaries? leverage cycle, influencing the pricing of risk and the level of risk in the economy. Our analysis focuses on liquidity policies? implications for household welfare. Within the context of our model, liquidity requirements are preferable to ...