Search Results
Working Paper
Attention and a Paradox of Uncertainty
I show that macroeconomic uncertainty during recessions can arise from people paying more attention to aggregate events. When information is dispersed, people's attempts to acquire more information can lead to higher aggregate volatility, forecast dispersion, and uncertainty about aggregate output. Information rigidity is reduced, consistent with evidence in forecast surveys, and distinct from the prediction of exogenous volatility shocks. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, endogenous attention accounts for half of the observed fluctuations in volatility, forecast dispersion, and ...
Working Paper
The Informational Effect of Monetary Policy and the Case for Policy Commitment
I study how the informational effect of monetary policy changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In my model, the private sector extracts information about unobserved shocks from the central bank's interest rate decisions. The central bank optimally changes the informational effect of the interest rate by committing to a state-contingent policy rule, in which case the Phillips curve becomes endogenous to the central bank's optimization problem. In a dynamic model, the optimal policy rule overshoots the natural-rate shock and gradually responds to the cost-push shock, which makes the ...
Report
The Pay and Non-Pay Content of Job Ads
How informative are job ads about the actual pay and amenities offered by employers? Using a comprehensive database of job ads posted by Norwegian employers, we develop a methodology to systematically classify the information on both pay and non-pay job attributes advertised in vacancy texts. We link this information to measures of employer attractiveness, which we derive from a job search model estimated on observed wages and worker mobility flows. About 55 percent of job ads provide information related to pay and nearly all ads feature information on non-pay attributes. We show that ...
Working Paper
An Information-Based Theory of Monopsony Power
We develop a tractable model of monopsony power based on information frictions in job search. Workers and firms choose probabilistic search strategies, with information costs limiting how precisely they can target matches. Firms post wages strategically, anticipating application behavior and exploiting a first-mover advantage. The model nests both directed and random search as limiting cases and yields a closed-form wage equation that shows the effects on wage-setting power of search frictions, labor market tightness and sorting. Wage markdowns in equilibrium arise not only from limited labor ...
Working Paper
Macroeconomic Expectations and Cognitive Noise
This paper examines forecast biases through cognitive noise, moving beyond the conventional view that frictions emerge solely from using external data. By extending Sims’s (2003) imperfect attention model to include imperfect memory, I propose a framework where cognitive constraints impact both external and internal information use. This innovation reveals horizon-dependent forecast sensitivity: short-term forecasts adjust sluggishly while long-term forecasts may overreact. I explore the macroeconomic impact of this behavior, showing how long-term expectations, heavily influenced by current ...
Working Paper
The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Wages under Information Frictions
I propose a new mechanism for sluggish wages based on workers' noisy information about the state of the economy. Wages do not respond immediately to a positive aggregate shock because workers do not (yet) have enough information to demand higher wages. This increases firms' incentives to post more vacancies, which makes unemployment volatile and sensitive to aggregate shocks. The model is robust to two major criticisms of existing theories of sluggish wages and volatile unemployment: flexibility of wages for new hires and pro-cyclicality of the opportunity cost of employment. Calibrated to ...
Working Paper
How Important Is the Information Effect of Monetary Policy?
Is the "information effect" of monetary policy quantitatively important? We first use a simple model to show that under asymmetric information, monetary policy surprises are correlated with the unobserved state of the economy. This correlation implies that monetary policy surprises provide information about the state of the economy, and at the same time, explains why the estimation of the information effect may be biased. We then develop a New Keynesian DSGE model under asymmetric information and calibrate model parameters to match macroeconomic dynamics in the US and forecasting accuracy in ...