Search Results
Report
The behavior of uncertainty and disagreement and their roles in economic prediction: a panel analysis
This paper examines point and density forecasts from the European Central Bank?s Survey of Professional Forecasters. We derive individual uncertainty measures along with individual point- and density-based measures of disagreement. We also explore the relationship between uncertainty and disagreement, as well as their roles in respondents? forecast performance and forecast revisions. We observe substantial heterogeneity in respondents? uncertainty and disagreement. In addition, there is little co-movement between uncertainty and disagreement, and forecast performance shows a more robust ...
Working Paper
Preventing Controversial Catastrophes
In a market-based democracy, we model different constituencies that disagree regarding the likelihood of economic disasters. Costly public policy initiatives to reduce or eliminate disasters are assessed relative to private alternatives presented by financial markets. Demand for such public policies falls as much as 40% with disagreement, and crowding out by private insurance drives most of the reduction. As support for disaster-reducing policy jumps in periods of disasters, costly policies may be adopted only after disasters occur. In some scenarios constituencies may even demand policies ...
Working Paper
A Closer Look at the Behavior of Uncertainty and Disagreement: Micro Evidence from the Euro Area
This paper examines point and density forecasts of real GDP growth, inflation and unemployment from the European Central Bank?s Survey of Professional Forecasters. We present individual uncertainty measures and introduce individual point- and density-based measures of disagreement. The data indicate substantial heterogeneity and persistence in respondents? uncertainty and disagreement, with uncertainty associated with prominent respondent effects and disagreement associated with prominent time effects. We also examine the co-movement between uncertainty and disagreement and find an ...
Discussion Paper
Connecting “The Dots”: Disagreement in the Federal Open Market Committee
People disagree, and so do the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). How much do they disagree? Why do they disagree? We look at the FOMC’s projections of the federal funds rate (FFR) and other variables and compare them with those in the New York Fed’s Survey of Primary Dealers (SPD). We show that the members of the FOMC tend to disagree more than the primary dealers and offer some potential explanations.
Discussion Paper
Fundamental Disagreement: How Much and Why?
Everyone disagrees, even professional forecasters, especially about big economic questions. Has potential output growth changed since the financial crisis? Are we bound for a period of “secular stagnation”? Will the European economy rebound? When is inflation getting back to mandate-consistent level? In this post, we document to what degree professional forecasters disagree and discuss potential reasons why. In a recent working paper, we document a set of novel facts about disagreement among professional forecasters over the last thirty years. We focus on the “trinity” of U.S. output ...
Report
Information acquisition and financial intermediation
Informational advantages of specialists relative to households lead to disagreement between the two in an intermediated market. Although households can acquire additional signals to reduce the informational asymmetry, the additional information is costly, making it rational for households to limit the accuracy of the signals they observe. I show that this leads the equity capital constraint to bind more frequently, making the asset prices in the economy more volatile unconditionally. When disagreement between households and specialists is high, however, return volatility decreases. I find ...
Report
Fundamental Disagreement about Monetary Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates
Using a unique data set of individual professional forecasts, we document disagreement about the future path of monetary policy, particularly at longer horizons. The stark differences in short rate forecasts imply strong disagreement about the risk-return trade-off of longer-term bonds. Longer-horizon short rate disagreement co-moves with term premiums. We estimate an affine term structure model in which investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about the long-run level of rates. Our model fits Treasury yields and the short rate paths predicted by different groups of investors and thus matches the ...
Journal Article
The Evolution of Disagreement in the Dot Plot
The Summary of Economic Projections offers important insights into the views of Federal Open Market Committee participants. The summary’s “dot plot” charts each participant’s assessment of the appropriate path for monetary policy given their economic outlook. A new index measuring the level of disagreement indicated by the dots shows that disagreement fell during the 2010s expansion, was nearly nonexistent early in the pandemic, and has been increasing recently. Policy disagreement is correlated with disagreement about future inflation, but factors unrelated to disagreement about the ...
Working Paper
A Closer Look at the Behavior of Uncertainty and Disagreement: Micro Evidence from the Euro Area
This paper examines point and density forecasts of real GDP growth, inflation and unemployment from the European Central Bank?s Survey of Professional Forecasters. We present individual uncertainty measures and introduce individual point- and density-based measures of disagreement. The data indicate substantial heterogeneity and persistence in respondents? uncertainty and disagreement, with uncertainty associated with prominent respondent effects and disagreement associated with prominent time effects. We also examine the co-movement between uncertainty and disagreement and find an ...
Working Paper
The Factor Structure of Disagreement
We estimate a Bayesian three-dimensional dynamic factor model on the individual forecasts in the Survey of Professional Forecasters. The factors extract the most important dimensions along which disagreement comoves across variables. We interpret our results through a general semi-structural dispersed information model. The two most important factors in the data describe disagreement about aggregate supply and demand, respectively. Up until the Great Moderation, supply disagreement was dominant, while in recent decades and particularly during the Great Recession, demand disagreement was most ...