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Keywords:cryptocurrencies OR Cryptocurrencies 

Working Paper
Should the central bank issue e-money?

Should a central bank take over the provision of e-money, a circulable electronic liability? We discuss how e-money technology changes the tradeoff between public and private provision, and the tradeoff between e-money and a central bank's existing liabilities like bank notes and reserves. The tradeoffs depend on i) the technological setup of the e-money system (as a token or an account; centralized or decentralized); ii) the potential improvement in the implementation and transmission of monetary policy; iii) the risks to safety and privacy from cyber attacks; and iv) the uncertain impact on ...
Working Papers , Paper 2019-3

Working Paper
Can currency competition work?

Can competition work among privately issued fiat currencies such as Bitcoin or Ethereum? Only sometimes. To show this, we build a model of competition among privately issued fiat currencies. We modify the current workhorse of monetary economics, the Lagos-Wright environment, by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own fiat currencies in order to maximize their utility. Otherwise, the model is standard. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which price stability is consistent with competing private monies but also that there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories with the ...
Working Papers , Paper 16-12

Working Paper
Beyond the Doomsday Economics of “Proof-of-Work” in Cryptocurrencies

This paper discusses the economics of how Bitcoin achieves data immutability, and thus payment finality, via costly computations, i.e., ?proof-of-work.? Further, it explores what the future might hold for cryptocurrencies modelled on this type of consensus algorithm. The conclusions are, first, that Bitcoin counterfeiting via ?double-spending? attacks is inherently profitable, making payment finality based on proof-of-work extremely expensive. Second, the transaction market cannot generate an adequate level of ?mining? income via fees as users free-ride on the fees of other transactions in a ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 355

Working Paper
The Fragility of Perfectly Safe Digital Money

Digital money differs from previous forms of money in an important way: it unbundles trust. Instead of relying on a trustworthy institution to settle payments, it relies on decentralized verification, whose cost is priced separately through congestion-sensitive gas fees. This arrangement creates a novel fragility from the interaction of two opposing forces: network externalities, which make digital money more valuable as adoption rises, and congestion fees, which make it more costly to use. We show that these forces generate strategic complementarities in redemption decisions and can create ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2026-037

Discussion Paper
Bitcoin Is Not a New Type of Money

Bitcoin, and more generally, cryptocurrencies, are often described as a new type of money. In this post, we argue that this is a misconception. Bitcoin may be money, but it is not a new type of money. To see what is truly new about Bitcoin, it is useful to make a distinction between “money,” the asset that is being exchanged, and the “exchange mechanism,” that is, the method or process through which the asset is transferred. Doing so reveals that monies with properties similar to Bitcoin have existed for centuries. However, the ability to make electronic exchanges without a trusted ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20200618

Discussion Paper
Can Decentralized Finance Provide More Protection for Crypto Investors?

Several centralized crypto entities failed in 2022, resulting in the cascading failure of other crypto firms and raising questions about the protection of crypto investors. While the total amount invested in the crypto sector remains small in the United States, more than 10 percent of all Americans are invested in cryptocurrencies. In this post, we examine whether migrating crypto activities from centralized platforms to decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols might afford investors better protection, especially in the absence of regulatory changes. We argue that while DeFi provides some ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20221221

Cryptocurrency Ownership among U.S. Households

An analysis of 2022 survey data found that only about 4.3% of U.S. households owned cryptocurrency and an even smaller proportion held large amounts.
On the Economy

Working Paper
Embedded Supervision: How to Build Regulation into Blockchain Finance

The spread of distributed ledger technology (DLT) in finance could help to improve the efficiency and quality of supervision. This paper makes the case for embedded supervision, i.e., a regulatory framework that provides for compliance in tokenized markets to be automatically monitored by reading the market?s ledger, thus reducing the need for firms to actively collect, verify and deliver data. After sketching out a design for such schemes, the paper explores the conditions under which distributed ledger data might be used to monitor compliance. To this end, a decentralized market is modelled ...
Globalization Institute Working Papers , Paper 371

Speech
Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017

Transcript of Moderated Conversation at UC Berkeley Event, US Economy: 10 Years after the Crisis: November 27, 2017.
Speech , Paper 264

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