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Working Paper
Unexpected Effects of Bank Bailouts: Depositors Need Not Apply and Need Not Run
Schoors, Koen; Lamers, Martien; Berger, Allen N.; Roman, Raluca (2020-03-05)
A key policy issue is whether bank bailouts weaken or strengthen market discipline. We address this by analyzing how bank bailouts influence deposit quantities and prices of recipients versus other banks. Using the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailouts, we find both deposit quantities and prices decline, consistent with substantially reduced demand for deposits by bailed-out banks that dominate market discipline supply effects. Main findings are robust to numerous checks and endogeneity tests. However, diving deeper into depositor heterogeneity suggests nuances. Increases in uninsured ...
Working Papers , Paper 21-10

Discussion Paper
Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency
Correia, Sergio A.; Luck, Stephan; Verner, Emil (2024-11-25)
Evidence from a 160-year-long panel of U.S. banks suggests that the ultimate cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always a deterioration of bank fundamentals that leads to insolvency. As described in our previous post, bank failures—including those that involve bank runs—are typically preceded by a slow deterioration of bank fundamentals and are hence remarkably predictable. In this final post of our three-part series, we relate the findings discussed previously to theories of bank failures, and we discuss the policy implications of our findings.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20241125

Discussion Paper
Why Large Bank Failures Are So Messy and What to Do about It?
Morgan, Donald P.; Yorulmazer, Tanju; Santos, João A. C.; McAndrews, James J. (2014-04-04)
If the Lehman Brothers failure proved anything, it was that large, complex bank failures are messy; they destroy value and can destabilize financial markets. We certainly don’t mean to trivialize matters by calling large bank failures “messy,” as it their messiness, particularly the destabilizing aspect, that creates the “too-big-to-fail” problem. In our contribution to the Economic Policy Review volume, we venture an explanation about why large bank failures are so messy and discuss a policy that can make them less so.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140404a

Journal Article
The FDIC Studies “Options for Deposit Insurance Reform”
Neely, Christopher J. (2023-06-08)
The FDIC favors targeted coverage of large accounts used for business payments when considering deposit insurance reform.
Economic Synopses , Issue 14 , Pages 2 pages

Discussion Paper
Banks Runs and Information
Anderson, Haelim; Copeland, Adam (2023-05-12)
The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank (SB) has raised questions about the fragility of the banking system. One striking aspect of these bank failures is how the runs that preceded them reflect risks and trade-offs that bankers and regulators have grappled with for many years. In this post, we highlight how these banks, with their concentrated and uninsured deposit bases, look quite similar to the small rural banks of the 1930s, before the creation of deposit insurance. We argue that, as with those small banks in the early 1930s, managing the information around SVB and ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20230512

Journal Article
What makes large bank failures so messy and what should be done about it?
Morgan, Donald P.; Yorulmazer, Tanju; Santos, Joao A. C.; McAndrews, James J. (2014-12)
This study argues that the defining feature of large and complex banks that makes their failures messy is their reliance on runnable financial liabilities. These liabilities confer liquidity or money-like services that may be impaired or destroyed in bankruptcy. To make large bank failures more orderly, the authors recommend that systemically important bank holding companies be required to issue ?bail-in-able? long-term debt that converts to equity in resolution. This reassures holders of uninsured liabilities that their claims will be honored in resolution, making them less likely to run. In ...
Economic Policy Review , Issue Dec , Pages 229-244

Working Paper
How Did Pre-Fed Banking Panics End?
Gorton, Gary; Tallman, Ellis W. (2016-01-14)
How did pre-Fed banking crises end? How did depositors? beliefs change? During the National Banking Era, 1863-1914, banks responded to the severe panics by suspending convertibility; that is, they refused to exchange cash for their liabilities (checking accounts). At the start of the suspension period, the private clearing houses cut off bank-specific information. Member banks were legally united into a single entity by the issuance of emergency loan certificates, a joint liability. A new market for certified checks opened, pricing the risk of clearing house failure. Certified checks traded ...
Working Papers (Old Series) , Paper 1603

Working Paper
Shadow Bank Runs
Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed (2020-06-08)
Short-term debt is commonly used to fund illiquid assets. A conventional view asserts that such arrangements are run-prone in part because redemptions must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. This sequential service protocol, however, appears absent in the wholesale banking sector---and yet, shadow banks appear vulnerable to runs. We explain how banking arrangements that fund fixed-cost operations using short-term debt can be run-prone even in the absence of sequential service. Interventions designed to eliminate run risk may or may not improve depositor welfare. We describe how ...
Working Papers , Paper 2020-012

Discussion Paper
Factors that Affect Bank Stability
Yorulmazer, Tanju; Eisenbach, Thomas M. (2014-02-26)
In a previous Liberty Street Economics post, we introduced a framework for thinking about the risks banks face. In particular, we distinguished between asset return risk and funding risk that can interact and cause a bank to fail. In our framework, a bank can fail for two reasons: 1-Low asset returns: Fundamental insolvency due to erosion of equity by low asset returns that don’t cover a bank’s debt burden. 2-Loss of funding: Costly liquidation of assets that erode equity.
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20140226

Discussion Paper
How (Un-)Informed Are Depositors in a Banking Panic? A Lesson from History
Blickle, Kristian S.; Brunnermeier, Markus K.; Luck, Stephan (2022-02-17)
How informed or uninformed are bank depositors in a banking crisis? Can depositors anticipate which banks will fail? Understanding the behavior of depositors in financial crises is key to evaluating the policy measures, such as deposit insurance, designed to prevent them. But this is difficult in modern settings. The fact that bank runs are rare and deposit insurance universal implies that it is rare to be able to observe how depositors would behave in absence of the policy. Hence, as empiricists, we are lacking the counterfactual of depositor behavior during a run that is undistorted by the ...
Liberty Street Economics , Paper 20220217

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