Search Results
Working Paper
The Anatomy of Financial Vulnerabilities and Crises
We extend the framework used in Aikman, Kiley, Lee, Palumbo, and Warusawitharana (2015) that maps vulnerabilities in the U.S. financial system to a broader set of advanced and emerging economies. Our extension tracks a broader set of vulnerabilities and, therefore, captures signs of different types of crises. The typical anatomy of the evolution of vulnerabilities before and after a financial crisis is as follows. Pressures in asset valuations materialize, and a build-up of imbalances in the external, financial, and nonfinancial sectors follows. A financial crisis is typically followed by a ...
Working Paper
Prudential Policies and Their Impact on Credit in the United States
We analyze how two types of recently used prudential policies affected the supply of credit in the United States. First, we test whether the U.S. bank stress tests had any impact on the supply of mortgage credit. We find that the first Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) stress test in 2011 had a negative effect on the share of jumbo mortgage originations and approval rates at stress-tested banks?banks with worse capital positions were impacted more negatively. Second, we analyze the impact of the 2013 Supervisory Guidance on Leveraged Lending and subsequent 2014 FAQ notice, ...
Speech
Five Points About Monetary Policy and Financial Stability (06-04-2016) Sveriges Riksbank Conference on Rethinking the Central Bank’s Mandate, Stockholm, Sweden
Since the 2008 global financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed, economists and policymakers have been evaluating the factors that led to the crisis, assessing what could have been done to prevent, or at least limit, the damage, and considering what can and should be done to reduce the probability and impact of future disruptions to financial stability. That this is a very broad topic can easily be seen by looking at the agendas of this and previous years? conferences organized by the Riksbank. Today I will focus my remarks on the nexus between monetary policy and financial ...
Working Paper
Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation
We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when banks are vulnerable to runs, banks’ leverage decisions are not ex-ante optimal: individual banks do not internalize that higher leverage makes other banks more vulnerable. The theory calls for introducing minimum capital requirements, even in the absence of bailouts.
Working Paper
Optimal Monetary and Macroprudential Policies: Gains and Pitfalls in a Model of Financial Intermediation
We estimate a quantitative general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial intermediation to examine the interaction of monetary and macroprudential stabilization policies. The estimation procedure uses credit spreads to help identify the role of financial shocks amenable to stabilization via monetary or macroprudential instruments. The estimated model implies that monetary policy should not respond strongly to the credit cycle and can only partially insulate the economy from the distortionary effects of financial frictions/shocks. A counter-cyclical macroprudential instrument ...
Discussion Paper
Credit Supply and the Housing Boom
There is no consensus among economists as to what drove the rise of U.S. house prices and household debt in the period leading up to the recent financial crisis. In this post, we argue that the fundamental factor behind that boom was an increase in the supply of mortgage credit, which was brought about by securitization and shadow banking, along with a surge in capital inflows from abroad. This argument is based on the interpretation of four macroeconomic developments between 2000 and 2006 provided by a general equilibrium model of housing and credit.
Working Paper
Evaluating the Information Value for Measures of Systemic Conditions
Timely identification of coincident systemic conditions and forward-looking capacity to anticipate adverse developments are critical for macroprudential policy. Despite clear recognition of these factors in literature, an evaluation methodology and empirical tests for the information value of coincident measures are lacking. This paper provides a twofold contribution to the literature: (i) a general-purpose evaluation framework for assessing information value for measures of systemic conditions, and (ii) an empirical assessment of the information value for several alternative measures of US ...
Working Paper
Can Macroprudential Measures Make Cross-Border Lending More Resilient? Lessons from the Taper Tantrum
We study the effect of macroprudential measures on cross-border lending during the taper tantrum, which saw a strong slowdown of cross-border bank lending to some jurisdictions. We use a novel dataset combining the BIS Stage 1 enhanced banking statistics on bilateral cross-border lending flows with the IBRN?s macroprudential database. Our results suggest that macroprudential measures implemented in borrowers? host countries prior to the taper tantrum significantly reduced the negative effect of the tantrum on cross-border lending growth. The shock-mitigating effect of host country ...
Working Paper
New Financial Stability Governance Structures and Central Banks
We evaluate the institutional frameworks developed to implement time-varying macroprudential policies in 58 countries. We focus on new financial stability committees (FSCs) that have grown dramatically in number since the global financial crisis, and their interaction with central banks, and infer countries? revealed preferences for effectiveness versus political economy considerations. Using cluster analysis, we find that only one-quarter of FSCs have both good processes and good tools to implement macroprudential actions, and that instead most FSCs have been designed to improve ...
Working Paper
A Theory of Safe Asset Creation, Systemic Risk, and Aggregate Demand
This paper presents a theory of safe asset creation and the interactions between systemic risk and aggregate demand. The creation of private safe assets by financial intermediaries requires them to take leverage, which generates a risk of future crisis (systemic risk) in which intermediaries liquidate assets to service their debt. In contrast, the creation of public safe assets by the government does not generate systemic risk as the government's power to tax allows it to better absorb losses. The level of systemic risk determines the neutral rate of interest through households' precautionary ...