Working Paper

Bank Runs, Fragility, and Regulation

Abstract: We examine banking regulation in a macroeconomic model of bank runs. We construct a general equilibrium model where banks may default because of fundamental or self-fulfilling runs. With only fundamental defaults, we show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained efficient. However, when banks are vulnerable to runs, banks’ leverage decisions are not ex-ante optimal: individual banks do not internalize that higher leverage makes other banks more vulnerable. The theory calls for introducing minimum capital requirements, even in the absence of bailouts.

Keywords: Self-fulfilling bank runs; Banking crises; Macroprudential policy;

JEL Classification: E32; G21; G01; G33; E44; E58;

https://doi.org/10.21034/wp.804

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Part of Series: Working Papers

Publication Date: 2024-04-11

Number: 804