Search Results
Report
Leader-Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism
We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows. Leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value-enhancing intervention costs. Through this channel, informed trades can exhibit predictability, in sharp contrast with Kyle (1985). We explain how this novel predictability shapes free-rider problems affecting governance, and how it produces price abnormalities analogous to ...
Working Paper
The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation and Governance
We find that ownership by different types of institutional investor has different implications for future firm misvaluation and governance characteristics. Dedicated institutional investors decrease future firm misvaluation relative to fundamentals, as well as the magnitude of this misvaluation. In contrast, transient institutional investors have the opposite effect. Using SEC Regulation FD as an exogenous shock to information dissemination, we find evidence consistent with dedicated institutions having an information advantage. The valuation effects are primarily driven by institutional ...