Search Results

Showing results 1 to 4 of approximately 4.

(refine search)
SORT BY: PREVIOUS / NEXT
Jel Classification:J42 

Working Paper
Labor Market Power

To measure labor market power in the US economy, we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market. We estimate key model parameters by matching the firm-level relationship between labor market share and employment size and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on (i) imperfect productivity-wage pass-through, (ii) strategic behavior of dominant employers, and (iii) the local labor market impact of mergers. We then measure welfare losses relative to the efficient allocation. ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 48

Working Paper
Minimum Wages, Efficiency and Welfare

It has long been argued that a minimum wage could alleviate efficiency losses from monopsony power. In a general equilibrium framework that quantitatively replicates results from recent empirical studies, we find higher minimum wages can improve welfare, but most welfare gains stem from redistribution rather than efficiency. Our model features oligopsonistic labor markets with heterogeneous workers and firms and yields analytical expressions that characterize the mechanisms by which minimum wages can improve efficiency, and how these deteriorate at higher minimum wages. We provide a method to ...
Opportunity and Inclusive Growth Institute Working Papers , Paper 058

Working Paper
Oligopsonies over the Business Cycle

With a duopsony model, we show how the degree of labor market slack relates to earnings inequality and firm size distribution across local labor markets and the business cycle. In booms, due to the high aggregate productivity, there is fierce competition with resulting high wages and full employment. During recessions, there is labor market slack and firms enjoy local market power. In periods in which the economy is moving in or out of a recession, there is an “accommodation” phase, with firms shrinking their labor forces and paying lower wages instead of competing for poached workers. We ...
Working Papers , Paper 20-06

Working Paper
Hysteresis via Endogenous Rigidity in Wages and Participation

We document that the past three ?jobless? recoveries also featured asymmetries in labor force participation and labor compensation, with each falling to new lows during each cycle. We model these asymmetries as resulting from a strategic complementarity in firms' wage setting and workers' job search strategies. Strategic complementarity results in a continuum of possible equilibria with higher-wage equilibria welfare dominating lower-wage equilibria. Assuming that no economic agent deviates from an existing strategy unless deviation is a unilateral best response, the model exhibits (1) ...
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2017-044

FILTER BY year

FILTER BY Content Type

FILTER BY Author

FILTER BY Jel Classification

E20 2 items

J20 2 items

D83 1 items

E24 1 items

J21 1 items

show more (3)

PREVIOUS / NEXT