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Author:Nosal, Ed 

Working Paper
Gambling for Dollars: Strategic Hedge Fund Manager Investment
Hedge fund managers differ in ability and investors want to distinguish good ones from bad. Via the design of their investment strategies, better fund managers want to ease this inference problem while worse fund managers want to complicate it. We impose only the minimal restrictions on the nature the investment strategies that, on average, returns reflect the hedge fund manager?s ability and that returns be bounded from below, and solve for the set of equilibria that emerge. We then show that under a variety of equilibrium refinements, a unique equilibrium obtains. In this equilibrium, investors set a cutoff standard for providing capital to a hedge fund: and invest if and only if returns exceed this cutoff. This induces less able hedge fund managers to adopt risky investment strategies that maximize the probability of meeting this cutoff by risking large losses if they fail. Over time, as investors learn about a hedge fund manager?s ability and less able hedge fund managers are stochastically weeded out, investors set less demanding re-investment standards. Our economy reconciles many facts regarding hedge fund performance. For example, in a regression with fixed hedge fund manager effects, returns of more experienced hedge fund managers decline, even though the expected profits of investors rise with the hedge fund manager?s experience; more experienced hedge funds deliver less volatile returns; persistence of returns is greater for better hedge funds; hedge fund failure rates are initially very high, but fall sharply with hedge fund manager experience; returns of exiting hedge funds are substantially worse than historical returns; and the longer is an investor?s horizon, the lower is the expected return of the hedge funds in which he invests.
AUTHORS: Bernhardt, Dan; Nosal, Ed
DATE: 2013-11-29

Working Paper
Private Takings
This paper examines the implications associated with a recent Supreme Court ruling, Kelo v. City of New London. Kelo can be interpreted as supporting eminent domain as a means of transferring property rights from one set of private agents ? landowners ? to another private agent ? a developer. Under voluntary exchange, where the developer sequentially acquires property rights from landowners via bargaining, a holdout problem arises. Eminent domain gives all of the bargaining power to the developer and, as a result, eliminates the holdout problem. This is the benefit of Kelo. However, landowners lose all their bargaining power and, as a result, their property investments become more inefficient. This is the cost of Kelo. A policy of eminent domain increases social welfare compared to voluntary sequential exchange only when the holdout problem is severe, and this occurs only if the developer has very little bargaining power. We propose an alternative government policy that eliminates the holdout problem but does not affect the bargaining power of the various parties. This alternative policy strictly dominates a policy of eminent domain, which implies that eminent domain is an inefficient way to transfer property rights between private agents.
AUTHORS: Marchesiani, Alessandro; Nosal, Ed
DATE: 2014-11-12

Working Paper
More on Middlemen: Equilibrium Entry and Efficiency in Intermediated Markets
This paper generalizes Rubinstein and Wolinsky?s model of middlemen (intermediation) by incorporating production and search costs, plus more general matching and bargaining. This allows us to study many new issues, including entry, efficiency and dynamics. In the benchmark model, equilibrium exists uniquely, and involves production and intermediation for some parameters but not others. Sometimes intermediation is essential: the market operates iff middlemen are active. If bargaining powers are set correctly equilibrium is efficient; if not there can be too much or too little economic activity. This is novel, compared to the original Rubinstein-Wolinsky model, where equilibrium is always efficient.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed; Wright, Randall; Wong, Yuet-Yee
DATE: 2014-11-01

Working Paper
Preventing Bank Runs
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the economic environment or an artifact of suboptimal contractual arrangements. In the class of direct mechanisms, Peck and Shell (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing runs within this class of mechanism is that banks cannot identify whether withdrawals are being driven by psychology or by fundamentals. Our solution to this problem is an indirect mechanism with the following two properties. First, it provides depositors an incentive to communicate whether they believe a run is on or not. Second, the mechanism threatens a suspension of convertibility conditional on what is revealed in these communications. Together, these two properties can eliminate the prospect of bank-run equilibria in the Diamond-Dybvig environment.
AUTHORS: Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed; Sultanum, Bruno
DATE: 2014-09-01

Journal Article
Clearing over-the-counter derivatives
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the over-the-counter derivatives market was not required to ?clear? transactions. This changed with the signing of the new financial reform legislation, the Dodd?Frank Act on July 21, 2010. Going forward, most OTC derivatives will be cleared through a particular set of institutional arrangements: a regulated clearinghouse. This article provides an overview of how clearing works, the potential benefits of central clearing for OTC derivatives, and the optimal clearing structure.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed
DATE: 2011-10

What is clearing and why is it important?
In the financial market disruption of 2007?08, the once arcane topic of clearing of financial products took center stage in major policy debates. Generally speaking, clearing has to do with the nuts and bolts of the contractual performance of financial products after they have been traded.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed; Steigerwald, Robert
DATE: 2010-09

Working Paper
Summer workshop on money, banking, payments and finance: an overview
The 2010 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago this summer, for the second year. The following document summarizes and ties together the papers presented.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed; Wright, Randall
DATE: 2010

Working Paper
Introduction to the macroeconomic dynamics: special issues on money, credit, and liquidity
We motivate and provide an overview to New Monetarist Economics. We then briefly describe the individual contributions to the Macroeconomics Dynamics special issues on money, credit and liquidity.
AUTHORS: Nosal, Ed; Waller, Christopher J.; Wright, Randall
DATE: 2010

Working Paper
Repos, fire sales, and bankruptcy policy
The events from the 2007?09 financial crisis have raised concerns that the failure of large financial institutions can lead to destabilizing fire sales of assets. The risk of fire sales is related to exemptions from bankruptcy's automatic stay provision enjoyed by a number of financial contracts, such as repo. An automatic stay prohibits collection actions by creditors against a bankrupt debtor or his property. It prevents a creditor from liquidating collateral of a defaulting debtor, since collateral is a lien on the debtor's property. In this paper, we construct a model of repo transactions, and consider the effects of changing the bankruptcy rule regarding the automatic stay on the activity in repo and real investment markets. We find that exempting repos from the automatic stay is beneficial for creditors who hold the borrowers' collateral. Although the exemption may increase the size of the repo market by enhancing the liquidity of collateral, it can also lead to subsequent damaging fire sales that are associated with reductions in real investment activity. Hence, policymakers face a trade-off between the benefits of investment activity and the benefits of liquid markets for collateral..
AUTHORS: Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carapella, Francesca; Kahn, Charles M.; Martin, Antoine; Mills, David C.; Nosal, Ed
DATE: 2012

Working Paper
Cash-in-the-Market Pricing in a Model with Money and Over-the-Counter Financial Markets
Entrepreneurs need cash to finance their real investments. Since cash is costly to hold, entrepreneurs will underinvest. If entrepreneurs can access financial markets prior to learning about an investment opportunity, they can sell some of their less liquid assets for cash and, as a result, invest at a higher level. When financial markets are over-the-counter, the price that the entrepreneur receives for the assets that he sells depends on the amount of liquidity (cash) that is in the OTC market: Greater levels of liquidity lead to higher asset prices. Since asset prices are linked to liquidity, they can fluctuate over time even though asset fundamentals are fixed. Bid and ask prices naturally arise in an OTC market and the bid-ask spread is negatively correlated with asset returns when changes in asset prices are not related to changes in the OTC market structure. An increase in inflation widens bid-ask spreads and decreases asset prices.
AUTHORS: Mattesini, Fabrizio; Nosal, Ed
DATE: 2011-11-13


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