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Author:Lin, Ping 

Working Paper
Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation

In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Working Papers , Paper 576

Journal Article
Diamond and Dybvig's classic theory of financial intermediation : what's missing?

The article shows that in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig model (1983), the ex ante efficient allocation can be implemented as a unique equilibrium. This is so even in the presence of the sequential service constraint, as emphasized by Wallace (1988), whereby the bank must solve a sequence of maximization problems as depositors contact it at different times. A three-trader example with constant relative risk-aversion utility is used in order to illustrate clearly the requirements that the sequential service constraint imposes on implementation.
Quarterly Review , Volume 24 , Issue Win , Pages 3-13

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