Working Paper
Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation
Abstract: In a finite-trader version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex-post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace, 1988), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex-ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
Keywords: Econometric models;
Status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Vol. 109, No. 1, March 2003, pp. 1-23)
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 1996
Number: 576