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Author:Barlevy, Gadi 

Working Paper
Characterizations in a random record model with a non-identically distributed initial record

We consider a sequence of random length M of independent absolutely continuous observations Xi, 1 = i = M, where M is geometric, X1 has cdf G, and Xi, i = 2, have cdf F. Let N be the number of upper records and Rn, n = 1, be the nth record value. We show that N is free of F if and only if G(x) = G0(F (x)) for some cdf G0 and that if E (|X2|) is finite so is E |Rn|) for n = 2 whenever N = n or N = n. We prove that the distribution of N along with appropriately chosen subsequences of E(Rn) characterize F and G, and along with subsequences of E Rn - Rn-1) characterize F and G up to a common ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-05-05

Working Paper
Estimating models of on-the-job search using record statistics

This paper proposes a methodology for estimating job search models that does not require either functional form assumptions or ruling out the presence of unobserved variation in worker ability. In particular, building on existing results from record- value theory, a branch of statistics that deals with the timing and magnitude of extreme values in sequences of random variables, I show how we can use wage data to identify the distribution from which workers search. Applying this insight to wage data in the NLSY dataset, I show that the data supports the hypothesis that the wage oer ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-03-18

Working Paper
Identification of search models with initial condition problems

This paper extends previous work on the identification of search models in which observed worker productivity is imperfectly observed. In particular, it establishes that these models remain identified even when employment histories are left-censored (i.e. we do not get to follow workers from their initial job out of unemployment), as well as when workers set different reservation wages from one another. We further show that allowing for heterogeneity in reservation can affect the empirical estimates we obtain, specifically estimates of the rate at which workers receive job offers.
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-06-03

Working Paper
A Model of Charles Ponzi

We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter trying to steal from short-lived agents. The model identifies when a Ponzi fraud can occur and what interventions can prevent it. A key feature of Ponzi frauds is that the long-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going.
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2025-05

Working Paper
A Model of Charles Ponzi

We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter trying to steal from short-lived agents. The model identifies when a Ponzi fraud can occur and what interventions can prevent it. A key feature of Ponzi frauds is that the long-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going.
Finance and Economics Discussion Series , Paper 2025-020

Working Paper
A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles

This paper develops an equilibrium model of speculative bubbles that can be used to explore the role of various policies in either giving rise to or eliminating the possibility of asset bubbles, e.g. restricting the use of certain types of loan contracts, imposing down- payment restrictions, and changing inter-bank rates. As in previous work by Allen and Gorton (1993) and Allen and Gale (2000), a bubble arises in the model because traders are assumed to purchase assets with borrowed funds. My model adds to this literature by allowing creditors and traders to enter into a more general class of ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-08-01

Newsletter
Interest-Only Mortgages and Speculation in Hot Housing Markets

Even as housing markets have temporarily shut down across the U.S. during the Covid-19 pandemic, housing remains a key sector that contributes disproportionately to fluctuations in overall economic activity and that will likely play an important role as the economy reopens. Interest in this market among research economists and policymakers intensified after the exceptional boom and bust in housing between 2003 and 2008. In this Chicago Fed Letter, we describe research in Barlevy and Fisher (2020)1 that examined patterns in the kinds of mortgages homebuyers took out in different cities during ...
Chicago Fed Letter , Issue 439 , Pages 6

Journal Article
Economic theory and asset bubbles

The author summarizes what economic theory tells us about when asset price bubbles can occur and what the welfare implications are from bursting them. In some cases, bursting a bubble may make society worse off by exacerbating the market distortions that give rise to the bubble in the first place.
Economic Perspectives , Volume 31 , Issue Q III , Pages 44-59

Working Paper
On Interest Rate Policy and Asset Bubbles

In a provocative paper, Gal (2014) showed that a policymaker who raises interest rates to rein in a potential bubble will only make a bubble bigger if one exists. This poses a challenge to advocates of lean-against-the-wind policies that call for raising interest rates to mitigate potential bubbles. In this paper, we argue there are situations in which the lean-against-the wind view is justified. First, we argue Gal?s framework abstracts from the possibility that a policymaker who raises rates will crowd out resources that would have otherwise been spent on the bubble. Once we modify Gal?s ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-2017-16

Working Paper
Pay for percentile

We propose an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions our scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students. Because this scheme employs only ordinal information, our scheme allows education authorities to employ completely new assessments at each testing date without ever having to equate various assessment forms. This approach removes incentives for teachers to teach to a particular assessment form and ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP-09-09

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