Working Paper

A Model of Charles Ponzi

Abstract: We develop a model of Ponzi schemes with asymmetric information to study Ponzi frauds. A long-lived agent offers to save on behalf of short-lived agents at a higher rate than they can earn themselves. The long-lived agent may genuinely have a superior savings technology, but may be an imposter trying to steal from short-lived agents. The model identifies when a Ponzi fraud can occur and what interventions can prevent it. A key feature of Ponzi frauds is that the long-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going.

JEL Classification: C73; D82; G51; K42; L14;

https://doi.org/10.21033/wp-2025-05

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Part of Series: Working Paper Series

Publication Date: 2025-03-18

Number: WP 2025-05