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Gaps and triangles
In this paper, we derive principles of optimal cyclical monetary policy in an economy without capital, with a cash-in-advance restriction on household transactions, and with monopolistic firms that set prices one period in advance. The only distortionary policy instruments are the nominal interest rate and the money supply. In this environment, it is feasible to undo both the cash in advance and the price setting restrictions, but not the monopolistic competition distortion. We show that it is optimal to follow the Friedman rule, and thus offset the cash-in-advance restriction.
Monetary policy with state contingent interest rates
What instruments of monetary policy must be used in order to implement a unique equilibrium? This paper revisits the issues addressed by Sargent and Wallace (1975) on the multiplicity of equilibria when policy is conducted with interest rate rules. We show that the appropriate interest rate instruments under uncertainty are state- contingent interest rates, i.e. the nominal returns on state-contingent nominal assets. A policy that pegs state-contingent nominal interest rates, and sets the initial money supply, implements a unique equilibrium. These results hold whether prices are flexible or ...
Monetary policy with single instrument feedback rules
We consider a standard cash in advance monetary model with flexible prices or prices set in advance and show that there are interest rate or money supply rules such that equilibria are unique. The existence of these single instrument rules depends on whether the economy has an infinite horizon or an arbitrarily large but finite horizon.
Short and long interest rate targets
We show that short and long nominal interest rates are independent monetary policy instruments. The pegging of both helps solving the problem of multiplicity that arises when only short rates are used as the instrument of policy. A peg of the nominal returns on assets of different maturities is equivalent to a peg of state-contingent interest rates. These are the rates that should be targeted in order to implement unique equilibria. At the zero bound, while it is still possible to target state-contingent interest rates, that is no longer equivalent to the target of the term structure.
Beliefs, competition, and bank runs