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Journal Article
Debt default and the insurance of labor income risks
In this article, we evaluate in detail the role of debt forgiveness in altering the transmission of labor income risk in the absence of catastrophic out-of-pocket "expense shocks" used in the literature on consumer default. The experiments we present can be thought of as: "If we insure the out-of-pocket expenses that constitute expenditure shocks, is there still a role of debt relief as a form of insurance against 'pure labor income risk'?" We address this question by studying a range of specifications for households' attitudes toward the intra- and intertemporal properties of income ...
Working Paper
Revenue-maximizing monetary policy
In this paper, we examine the impact that changes in the rate of money creation and reserve requirements have on real seigniorage revenue. We consider two additional features that differ from previous analyses. First, the model economies grow endogenously, and that growth depends on the accumulation of intermediated capital. Second, agents have two means of financing; one is bank deposits against which reserves must be held and the other is a nonbank intermediary. Thus, growth-rate effects and financing-substitution effects are both present, and one can assess the quantitiative importance or ...
Working Paper
A note on sunspots with heterogeneous agents
This paper studies sunspot fluctuations in a model with heterogeneous households. We find that wealth inequality reduces the degree of increasing returns needed to produce indeterminacy, while wage inequality increases it. When the model is calibrated to match the joint distribution of hours, income, and wealth, the required degree of increasing returns to scale is still much too high to be supported empirically (although smaller than similar homogeneous agent economies). We also find that the model robustly predicts only one sunspot, despite having 1,262 predetermined state variables.
Working Paper
Are harsh penalties for default really better?
How might society ensure the allocation of credit to those who lack meaningful collateral? Two very different options that have each been pursued by a variety of societies through time and space are (i) relatively harsh penalties for default and, more recently, (ii) loan guarantee programs that allow borrowers to default subject to moderate consequences and use public funds to compensate lenders. The goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative statement about the relative desirability of these responses. Our findings are twofold. First, we show that under a wide array of circumstances, ...
Working Paper
A quantitative theory of information and unsecured credit
Over the past three decades five striking features of aggregates in the unsecured credit market have been documented: (1) rising availability of credit along both the intensive and extensive margins, (2) rising debt accumulation, (3) rising bankruptcy rates and discharge in bankruptcy, (4) rising dispersion in interest rates across households, and (5) the emergence of a discount for borrowers with good credit ratings. We show that all five outcomes are quantitatively consistent with improvements in the ability of lenders to observe borrower characteristics. Part of our contribution is the ...
Journal Article
Zero Growth and Long-Run Inequality
Using a basic model to study both wealth and income inequality and their relations to long-run economic growth may lead to questionable conclusions. We consider a more complex model that includes realistic variation in the levels of income and wealth across households in addition to a new ingredient, luck in each household?s labor productivity. Using this model,we determine that existing estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor are generally far away from the region where inequality would explode if long-run growth were zero.
Working Paper
Consumer Bankruptcy and Unemployment Insurance
We quantitatively evaluate the effects of UI on bankruptcy in an equilibrium model of labor market search and defaultable debt. First, we ask whether a standard unsecured credit model extended with labor market search and matching frictions can account for the negative correlation between UI caps and bankruptcy rates observed in the data. The model can account for this fact only if estimated with the employment rate among bankruptcy filers as a target. Not matching this employment rate underestimates the consumption smoothing benefits of UI cap increases, as the model assigns too much ...
Working Paper
Equilibrium Multiplicity in Aiyagari and Krusell-Smith
Repeatedly solving the Aiyagari (1994) model with random parameters, we construct hundreds of examples with multiple stationary equilibria. We never find multiplicity with risk aversion less than ≈ 1.49, depreciation less than ≈ 0.19, or income persistence less than ≈ 0.47, and multiplicity requires a disaster state for income. In cases with multiplicity, the lowest rental rate occurs near depreciation times the capital share. It is possible for the economy, without a change in fundamentals, to transition rationally from a higher-rate equilibrium to one with a lower rental rate, lower ...
Working Paper
The long run effects of changes in tax progressivity
This paper compares the steady state outcomes of revenue-neutral changes to the progressivity of the tax schedule. Our economy features heterogeneous households who differ in their preferences and permanent labor productivities, but it does not have idiosyncratic risk. We find that increases in the progressivity of the tax schedule are associated with long-run distributions with greater aggregate income, wealth, and labor input. Average hours generally declines as the tax schedule becomes more progressive implying that the economy substitutes away from less productive workers toward more ...
Working Paper
Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation
We study the tax systems that arise in a once-and-for-all majority voting equilibrium embedded within a macroeconomic model of inequality. We find that majority voting delivers (i) a small set of outcomes, (ii) zero labor income taxation, and (iii) nearly zero transfers. We find that majority voting, contrary to the literature developed in models without idiosyncratic risk, is quite powerful at restricting outcomes; however, it also delivers predictions inconsistent with observed tax systems.