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Working Paper
Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency
The paper examines how two targeted countries strategically deploy their counterterror forces when lobbying defense firms influence counterterror provision. For proactive measures, lobbying activities in a single targeted country lessen underprovision, raise overall counterterrorism, and reduce terrorism. Welfare decreases in the politically influenced country but increases in the other targeted country owing to enhanced free riding. Lobbying influence on the targeted countries’ welfare is tied to terrorists’ targeting preferences and how the lobbied government weighs citizens’ welfare. ...
Working Paper
Trade and Terrorism: A Disaggregated Approach
This paper constructs a model of trade consequences of terrorism, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism?s effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufacturing goods. While terrorism has little or no influence on trade of primary products, terrorism reduces trade of manufactured goods. This novel finding pinpoints the avenue by which terrorism harms trade and suggests why previous studies that looked at ...
Working Paper
Terms-of-Trade and Counterterrorism Externalities
This paper investigates the interplay of trade and terrorism externalities under free trade between a developed nation that exports a manufactured good to and imports a primary product from a developing nation. A terrorist organization targets both nations and reduces its attacks in response to a nation?s defensive counterterrorism efforts, while transferring some of its attacks abroad. Terms-of-trade considerations lead the developed nation to raise its counterterrorism level beyond the ?small-country? level, thus compounding its over provision of these measures. By contrast, the developing ...
Working Paper
Terrorism, Trade and Welfare: Some Paradoxes and a Policy Conundrum
We present a standard trade model and show that terrorism can be trade inducing, starting from autarky. In addition, terrorism can be shown to be welfare augmenting for a group of nations. Finally, we present some qualitative conditions that identify when a nation?s trade volume may rise (or fall) in response to a greater incidence of terrorism. Our trade and welfare results point to potential difficulties in international coordination of counterterrorism policy because of terrorism?s differential impact across nations.
Working Paper
Foreign direct investment, aid, and terrorism: an analysis of developing countries
Using a dynamic panel data framework, we investigate the relationship between the two major forms of terrorism and foreign direct investment (FDI). We then analyze how these relationships are affected by foreign aid flows. The analysis focuses on 78 developing countries for 1984- 2008. Our findings suggest that all types of terrorism depress FDI. In addition, aid mitigates the negative effects of total and domestic terrorism on FDI; however, this is not the case for transnational terrorism. This finding highlights that different forms of terrorism call for tailoring mitigating strategies. ...
Working Paper
Immigration policy and counterterrorism
A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the ...
Journal Article
The Trade-Offs of Counterterrorism Policies
This article provides a modern overview of counterterrorism tools and their trade-offs for curbing terrorist attacks and their consequences. Defensive and proactive countermeasures constitute two main classes of counterterror tools deployed by targeted governments. The primary drawback of defensive actions, which make terrorist attacks more costly and less apt to succeed, is attack transference that shifts the mode, venue, or target of attacks to those less protected. In contrast, offensive proactive measures, which confront the terrorists directly, may result in backlash as terrorist ...
Working Paper
Voluntary participation in a terror group and counterterrorism policy
A three-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures are affected by volunteers’ choice in joining a terrorist group. In stage 1, the government chooses both proactive and defensive countermeasures, while looking ahead to the anticipated size and actions of terrorist groups. After radicalized individuals choose whether to join a terrorist group in stage 2, group members then allocate their time between work and terrorist operations. Based on wages and government counterterrorism, the game characterizes the extensive margin determining group size and the intensive margin ...
Working Paper
Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist groups are solely empirical concerning group survival, outbidding, and terrorism level, while ignoring the role that government countermeasures exert ...
Working Paper
Foreign aid as counterterrorism policy
We present a model where foreign aid bolsters proactive counterterrorism efforts of a foreign nation that is a source for transnational terrorism. Our two-stage game has the donor country choosing a first-stage contract consisting of terrorism-fighting tied aid and general assistance. In stage 2, the donor decides its defensive measures, while the recipient country chooses its proactive measures. An interesting finding is that the foreign enforcement best-response function is likely to reflect strategic substitutes, while the donor's enforcement best-response function is apt to indicate ...