Working Paper
Immigration policy and counterterrorism
Abstract: A terrorist group, based in a developing (host) country, draws unskilled and skilled labor from the productive sector to conduct attacks at home and abroad. The host nation chooses proactive countermeasures, while accounting for the terrorist campaign. Moreover, a targeted developed nation decides its optimal mix of immigration quotas and defensive counterterrorism actions. Even though proactive measures in the host country may not curb terrorism at home, it may still be advantageous in terms of national income. Increases in the unskilled immigration quota augment terrorism against the developed country; increases in the skilled immigration quota may or may not raise terrorism against the developed country. When the developed country assumes a leadership role, it strategically augments its terrorism defenses and reduces its unskilled immigration quota to induce more proactive measures in the host country. The influence of leadership on the skilled immigration quota is more nuanced.
Keywords: Emigration and immigration; Terrorism;
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 2011
Number: 2011-012