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Report
The Theory of Financial Stability Meets Reality
A large literature at the intersection of economics and finance offers prescriptions for regulating banks to increase financial stability. This literature abstracts from the discretion that accounting standards give banks over financial reporting, creating a gap between the information assumed to be available to regulators in models of optimal regulation and the information available to regulators in reality. We bridge insights from the economics, finance, and accounting literatures to synthesize knowledge about the design and implementation of bank regulation and identify areas where more ...
Discussion Paper
Is This Time Different: How Are Banks Performing during the Recent Interest Rate Increases Compared to 2004–2006?
In 2022, the Federal Reserve began its latest monetary tightening cycle. Increases in interest rates are generally favorable for commercial bank net interest income (interest income minus interest expense). This relationship holds because many loan types have adjustable rates, and banks do not pass through all interest rate increases to depositors.
Working Paper
Social Externalities of Bank Enforcement Actions: The Case of Minority Lending
This paper studies the role banking supervision plays in improving access to credit for minorities by investigating how enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) affect the bank borrower base. We find that, after an EDO's termination, banks significantly increase residential mortgage lending to minorities, even when the enforcement order is not issued for violations of fair lending laws. Our findings suggest that improvements in banks' internal credit assessment and compliance due to the enforcement process are associated with the expansion in lending to minority borrowers. Our findings ...
Working Paper
Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations
We document the importance of a financial sponsor when a borrower violates a covenant, providing creditors the opportunity to enforce debt contracts. We identify private-equity (PE) sponsored borrowers in the Shared National Credit Program (SNC) data and find PE-sponsored borrowers violate covenants more often than comparable non-PE borrowers. Yet, compared to non-PE, PE-backed borrowers experience smaller reductions in credit commitment upon violation, suggesting lenders are lenient with PE sponsors. Moreover, this leniency is stronger among financially healthier lenders. We show that our ...