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Working Paper
The choice of a monetary policy reaction function in a simple optimizing model
Monetary policy reaction functions are compared in a simple optimizing model with one-period nominal stickiness, i.i.d. shocks, and no capital accumulation. The interest rate is the instrument and is either kept constant, "interest rate targeting" for short, or used in targeting one of the following: money, the price level, output, nominal income (output), money growth, inflation, and the sum of inflation and output. There are three varieties of one-period nominal stickiness---wage stickiness, wage and price stickiness, and price stickiness---and three kinds of shocks---money demand shocks, ...
Working Paper
Tradeoffs between inflation and output-gap variances in an optimizing-agent model
We demonstrate the existence of a monetary policy tradeoff between price-inflation variability and output-gap variability in an optimizing-agent model with staggered nominal wage and price contracts. This variance tradeoff is absent only in the special case in which prices are sticky and wages are perfectly flexible. When the model is calibrated to exhibit an empirically reasonable degree of nominal wage inertia, strict inflation targeting induces substantial output-gap volatility.
Working Paper
Price-level determinacy, lower bounds on the nominal interest rate, and liquidity traps
We consider monetary-policy rules with inflation-rate targets and interest-rate or money-growth instruments using a flexible-price, perfect-foresight model. There is always a locally-unique target equilibrium. There may also be below-target equilibria (BTE) with inflation always below target and constant, asymptotically approaching or eventually reaching a below-target value, or oscillating. Liquidity traps are neither necessary nor sufficient for BTE which can arise if monetary policy keeps the interest rate above a lower bound. We construct monetary rules that preclude BTE when fiscal ...
Working Paper
Exact utilities under alternative monetary rules in a simple macro model with optimizing agents
We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the representative agent. Fully optimal policy can attain the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Fully optimal policy is contrasted with both 'naive' and 'sophisticated' simple rules that involve, respectively, ...
Working Paper
Uncertainty, instrument choice, and the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium: microeconomic and macroeconomic examples
This paper contains two examples of static, symmetric, positive-sum games with two strategic players and a play by nature: (1) a microeconomic game between duopolists with joint costs facing uncertain demands for differentiated goods and (2) a macroeconomic game between two countries' with inflation-bias preferences confronting uncertain demands for moneys. In both examples, each player can choose either of two variables as an instrument, and reaction functions are linear in the chosen instruments. With no uncertainty, there are four (Nash) equilibria, one for each possible instrument pair, ...
Working Paper
Optimal monetary policy with staggered wage and price contracts
We formulate an optimizing-agent model in which both labor and product markets exhibit monopolistic competition and staggered nominal contracts. The unconditional expectation of average household utility can be expressed in terms of the unconditional variances of the output gap, price inflation, and wage inflation. Monetary policy cannot replicate the Pareto-optimal equilibrium that would occur under completely flexible wages and prices; that is, the model exhibits a tradeoff between stabilizing the output gap, price inflation, and wage inflation. The Pareto optimum is attainable only if ...