Search Results
Journal Article
Inside-money theory after Diamond and Dybvig
In this article, I discuss the broad influence of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in the field of money and banking. My review is centered on two aspects of their sharp concept of liquidity when doing mechanism design in a simple economy with a single resource constraint. It calls into question an old approach in macroeconomics of mixing trading games with market institutions. A comparison with the modern money literature reveals that individuals in that model are strongly monitored. A middle ground between that setting and the anonymity setup of matching models of money without credit should lead ...
Discussion Paper
Private money and reserve management in a random-matching model
In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve-holding banks. We allow for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random-matching framework. Some individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private notes and to keep reserves with a clearinghouse. Bank liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. We find conditions under which note redemptions act as a force that is sufficient to stabilize note issue by the banking sector.
Working Paper
Private money and reserve management in a random matching model
The authors introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which the authors identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse, which they call the treasury. The liabilities are redeemed according to a stochastic process that depends on the endogenous trades. The treasury removes the banking technology from banks that are not able to meet the redemptions in a given period. This, together with the market ...
Conference Paper
Inside and outside money as alternative media of exchange
Working Paper
Counterfeiting as private money in mechanism design
We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.
Working Paper
A model of regulated private bank-note issue
A random-matching model (of money) is formulated in which there is complete public knowledge of the trading histories of a subset of the population, called banks, and no public knowledge of the trading histories of the complement of that subset, called nonbanks. Each person, whether a banker or a non banker, is assumed to have the technological capability to create indivisible, distinct and durable objects called notes. If outside money is indivisible and sufficiently scarce, then an optimal mechanism is shown to have note issue and destruction (redemption) by banks.
Working Paper
Some benefits of cyclical monetary policy
In this paper, we present a simple random-matching model in which different seasons translate into different propensities to consume and produce. We find that the cyclical creation and destruction of money is beneficial for welfare under a wide variety of circumstances. Our model of seasons can be interpreted as providing support for the creation of the Federal Reserve System, with its mandate of supplying an elastic currency for the nation.