Working Paper
Counterfeiting as private money in mechanism design
Abstract: We describe counterfeiting activity as the issuance of private money, one which is difficult to monitor. Our approach, which amends the basic random-matching model of money in mechanism design, allows a tractable welfare analysis of currency competition. We show that it is not efficient to eliminate counterfeiting activity completely. We do not appeal to lottery devices, and we argue that this is consistent with imperfect monitoring.
Keywords: Counterfeits and counterfeiting; Money;
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-200716
Access Documents
File(s):
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-200716
Description: Persistent link
File(s):
File format is application/pdf
https://www.clevelandfed.org/-/media/project/clevelandfedtenant/clevelandfedsite/publications/working-papers/2007/wp-0716-counterfeiting-as-private-money-in-mechanism-design-pdf.pdf
Description: Full text
Authors
Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers (Old Series)
Publication Date: 2007
Number: 0716