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Working Paper
Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World
We study climate policy in an economy with heterogeneous households, two types of goods (clean and dirty), and a climate externality from the dirty good. Using household expenditure and emissions data, we document that low-income households have higher emissions per dollar spent than high-income households, making a flat carbon tax regressive. We build a model that captures this fact and study climate policies that are neutral with respect to the income distribution. We show that the constrained optimal carbon tax in a heterogeneous economy is heterogeneous: Higher-income households face a ...
Working Paper
Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World
We study climate policy in an economy with heterogeneous households, two types of goods (clean and dirty), and a climate externality from the dirty good. Using household expenditure and emissions data, we document that low-income households have higher emissions per dollar spent than high-income households, making a carbon tax regressive. We build a model that captures this fact and study climate policies that are neutral with respect to the income distribution. A central feature of these policies is that resource transfers across consumers are ruled out. We show that the constrained optimal ...
Working Paper
Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World
We characterize optimal climate policy in an economy with heterogeneous households and non-homothetic preferences. We focus on constrained efficiency, where the planner is restricted from transferring resources across households. We derive three results. First, the constrained-optimal carbon tax is heterogeneous and progressive. Second, if restricted to a uniform tax, the optimal rate is lower than the standard Pigouvian level due to inequality. Third, this allocation can be decentralized using only uniform instruments—a carbon tax, a clean subsidy and a lump-sum transfer. In a quantitative ...