Working Paper Revision
Unequal Climate Policy in an Unequal World
Abstract: We characterize optimal climate policy in an economy with heterogeneous households and non-homothetic preferences. We focus on constrained efficiency, where the planner is restricted from transferring resources across households. We derive three results. First, the constrained-optimal carbon tax is heterogeneous and progressive. Second, if restricted to a uniform tax, the optimal rate is lower than the standard Pigouvian level due to inequality. Third, this allocation can be decentralized using only uniform instruments—a carbon tax, a clean subsidy and a lump-sum transfer. In a quantitative application, we show this policy generates a Pareto improvement, reconciling climate efficiency with inequality concerns.
JEL Classification: E21; H21; H23; Q54;
https://doi.org/10.24149/gwp427r2
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Part of Series: Globalization Institute Working Papers
Publication Date: 2026-02-02
Number: 427
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