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Author:Arce, Fernando 

Working Paper
Overborrowing, Underborrowing, and Macroprudential Policy

In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with pecuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained-efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on the production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macroprudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macroprudential taxes on borrowing ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2023-20

Working Paper
Tax Revolts and Sovereign Defaults

Protests and fiscal crises often coincide, with complex causal dynamics at play. We examine the interaction between tax revolts and sovereign risk using a quantitative structural model calibrated to Argentina during the Macri administration (2015-2019). In the model, the government can be controlled by political parties with different preferences for redistribution. Households may opt to revolt in response to the fiscal policies of the ruler. While revolts entail economic costs, they also increase the likelihood of political turnover. Our model mirrors the data by generating political crises ...
Working Paper Series , Paper WP 2024-07

Working Paper
Overborrowing, Underborrowing, and Macroprudential Policy

In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with pecuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained-efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on the production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macroprudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the constrained-efficient equilibrium. In our quantitative analysis, macroprudential taxes on borrowing ...
Working Papers , Paper 798

Working Paper
A Macroprudential Theory of Foreign Reserve Accumulation

This paper proposes a theory of foreign reserves as macroprudential policy. We study an open economy model of financial crises, in which pecuniary externalities lead to over-borrowing, and show that by accumulating international reserves, the government can achieve the constrained-efficient allocation. The optimal reserve accumulation policy leans against the wind and significantly reduces the exposure to financial crises. The theory is consistent with the joint dynamics of private and official capital flows, both over time and in the cross section, and can quantitatively account for the ...
Working Papers , Paper 761

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