Working Paper

The Politics of Debt in the Era of Rising Rates

Abstract: We examine how the post-pandemic trajectory of risk-free rates—from historically low levels in 2020 to a steep rise in 2022—affects sovereign debt management and default risk in emerging markets (EMs). Using a dynamic political economy model, we show that weak institutional environments with political incentives to engage in corruption spending lead to over-borrowing and increased default risk, especially during low-rate periods. As rates rise, EMs face high risks of default or the need for austerity programs, depending on the severity of productivity shocks. While International Financial Institution (IFI) lending provides short-term relief, it can fuel moral hazard and corruption. Making IFI loans contingent on anti-corruption efforts reduces default risk. However, even full monitoring cannot eliminate the incentives for fiscal mismanagement, as governments may still over-borrow during favorable periods without addressing sustainability. We also find that Quantitative Performance Criteria (QPC), such as a debt-ceiling rule, are less effective as they leave room for corruption that creates default risk and can generate welfare losses relative to a scenario without IFI debt.

Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crises; Institutions; Corruption; Sovereign Default; IFI loans; Emerging Markets;

JEL Classification: D72; E43; F34; E62; F41;

https://doi.org/10.21144/wp24-12

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Part of Series: Working Paper

Publication Date: 2024-10-25

Number: 24-12