Discussion Paper

Introducing a Series on Large and Complex Banks

Abstract: The chorus of criticism levied against mega-banks has, in some cases, outrun the research needed to back the criticism. To help the research catch up with the rhetoric, financial economists here at the New York Fed have engaged in a systematic study of the economics of large and complex banks and their resolution in the event of failure. The result of those efforts is a collection of eleven papers, each of which was subject to review (internal and external). The papers are now online in our Economic Policy Review. Today, we begin a two-week series of posts that present the key findings of each paper. Here, I?ll give a taste of each and some of the essential points delivered by them.

Keywords: TBTF subsidy; moral hazard; internalization; bail in; Large and complex banks; dealer banks; bank resolution; too big to fail; bank failures;

JEL Classification: G2;

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Part of Series: Liberty Street Economics

Publication Date: 2014-03-25

Number: 201404325b