Working Paper
Default and Interest Rate Shocks: Renegotiation Matters
Abstract: We develop a sovereign default model with debt renegotiation in which interest-rate shocks affect default incentives through two mechanisms. Under the standard mechanism, higher interest rates tighten the government’s budget constraint. Under the renegotiation mechanism, higher rates increase lenders’ opportunity cost of holding delinquent debt, which makes lenders accept larger haircuts and makes default more attractive for the government. We argue that our novel renegotiation mechanism reconciles standard sovereign default models with the narrative that the sharp increase in the real interest rate in the United States was a relevant factor in the defaults of the early 1980s.
JEL Classification: F41; F34; G28;
https://doi.org/10.21034/sr.679
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Bibliographic Information
Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Part of Series: Staff Report
Publication Date: 2025-12-08
Number: 679