Working Paper

Heterogeneous Capital Ownership, Partial Democracy and Political Support for Immigration

Abstract: This paper analyzes and compares equilibrium immigration levels of some popular political economy models in the context of unequal capital holdings. We show that immigration rises (falls) with inequality in a limited (inclusive) democracy where only a small (large) fraction of the population has voting rights. Furthermore, we highlight the similarities between a campaign-contributions model and a partial-democracy model in terms of their predictions about immigration policy. In particular, we show that extension of voting rights in a partial democracy has qualitatively similar implications on immigration policy as reducing the relative weight on campaign contributions.

Keywords: legal immigration policy; inequality in capital ownership; partial democracy; voter support for immigration; campaign contributions; lobbying;

JEL Classification: F22; F66; J61;

https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2024.035

Bibliographic Information

Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Part of Series: Working Papers

Publication Date: 2024-10-15

Number: 2024-035