Working Paper Revision
International Financial Regulation: The Role of Banking Sector Sizes
Abstract: Several countries do not or only partially follow basic international regulatory guidelines. Though these countries are small, they aggregate to a nontrivial portion of the global financial market. This paper studies the incentives of regulators to coordinate their efforts and shows that countries with a small banking sector may oppose any financial regulation, even as larger countries commit to stricter rules. As a result, it may be infeasible to design regulatory minimum standards that are enforced by all jurisdictions, which explains key issues around the implementation of the Basel Agreements.
JEL Classification: D62; F36; F42; G15; G21;
https://doi.org/10.18651/RWP2021-13
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https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/research-working-papers/national-interests-spillovers-and-macroprudential-coordination/
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Part of Series: Research Working Paper
Publication Date: 2026-05-14
Number: RWP 21-13
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- Working Paper Revision (2026-05-14) : You are here.
- Working Paper Revision (2024-07-10) : International Financial Regulation: The Role of Banking Sector Sizes
- Working Paper Original (2021-11-17) : National Interests, Spillovers and Macroprudential Coordination