Domestic Debt and Sovereign Defaults

Mallucci, Enrico

doi:10.17016/IFDP.2015.1153

Working Paper

Domestic Debt and Sovereign Defaults

Abstract: This paper examines how domestic holdings of government debt affect sovereign default risk and government debt management. I develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with both external and domestic debt that endogenously generates output contraction upon default. Domestic holdings of government debt weaken investors' balance sheets and induce a contraction of credit and output upon default. I calibrate the model to the Argentinean economy and show that the model reproduces key empirical moments. Introducing domestic debt also yields relevant normative implications. While domestic debt is crucial to determining the risk of default, the efficient internal-external composition of debt cannot be achieved without government intervention. Pigouvian subsidies can restore efficiency.

Keywords: sovereign defaults; Domestic Debt; Debt Crises; credit markets;

JEL Classification: F34; F41; H63;

https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2015.1153