Working Paper Revision
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
Abstract: In the US, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part-time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. In a quantitative model, the monetary requirement induces workers to stay longer in unemployment because low-paying jobs are not covered by UI. Since it mitigates moral hazard, the optimal UI design has a high monetary requirement.
Keywords: Unemployment Insurance; UI Eligibility; Optimal UI;
JEL Classification: E24; E61; J65;
https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202210r
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https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202210r
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Provider: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Part of Series: Working Papers
Publication Date: 2023-03-06
Number: 22-10R
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- Working Paper Revision (2023-03-06) : You are here.
- Working Paper Original (2022-04-19) : Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements