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Working Paper
(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions
Trade sanctions are a common instrument of diplomatic retaliation. To guide current and future policy, we ask: What is the most cost-efficient way to impose tradesanctions against Russia? To answer this question, we build a quantitative model of international trade with input-output connections. Sanctioning countries simultaneously choose import tariffs to maximize their income and to minimize Russia’s income, with different weights placed on these objectives. We find, first, that for countries with a small willingness to pay for sanctions against Russia, the most cost-efficient sanction is ...
Working Paper
It's Good Weather for More Government: The Effect of Weather on Fiscal Policy
I show that weather conditions on election day affect future fiscal policy. When it rains during state elections, there is an increase in the relative income of voters, which is followed by an increase in expenditure and debt. The increase in expenditure is directed towards a larger police and safety budget. This result is compatible with a model of complementarity between consumption and public goods. In the model, high-income voters support an increase in safety budget because they benefit more from it than low-income voters.
Working Paper
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
In the US, workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part-time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. In a quantitative model, the monetary requirement induces workers to stay longer in unemployment because low-paying jobs are not covered by UI. Since it mitigates moral hazard, the optimal UI design ...
Working Paper
R&D Subsidy and Import Substitution: Growing in the Shadow of Protection
I study the effect of an innovation subsidy on the growth of firms in a developing country. Using administrative microdata for Brazil and difference-in-differences, I find that innovation subsidies drive firm growth by facilitating firm entry into high-tariff markets with domestically produced versions of foreign goods. After receiving an innovation subsidy, firms issue more patents, expand their workforce, and diversify their product line. However, these patents receive minimal citations, while also heavily citing foreign patents. Firms increase imports of foreign inputs and expand their ...
Working Paper
The Employment Consequences of Anti-Dumping Tariffs: Lessons from Brazil
Can anti-dumping tariffs increase employment? We compile data on all antidumping (AD) investigations in Brazil matching it to firm-level administrative employment information. Using difference-in-differences, we find that an AD tariff decreases imports and increases employment in the protected sector. Moreover, downstream firms decrease employment, while upstream ones are not affected. To quantify the aggregate effect of these tariffs, we build a model with international trade, input-output linkages, and labor force participation. We show that the Brazilian AD policy increased employment by ...
Working Paper
Employment and Welfare Effects of the Quota for Disabled Workers in Brazil
I study the effect of a quota for disabled workers on the labor market and on welfare. Using a task-based model, I show that the effect of a quota will depend on the productivity of disabled workers and their labor supply elasticity. I estimate the productivity of disabled workers using variation from inspections of the quota. I find that the quota increased the hiring of disabled workers, but it reduced wages and employment of non-disabled workers, suggesting that the quota reduced firms’ productivity. I estimate the labor supply elasticity of disabled workers using heterogeneous exposure ...
Working Paper
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
In the US, unemployed workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement that stipulates the minimum qualifying work spell and a monetary requirement that determines a past minimum wage. This paper develops a heterogeneous agents model with history-dependent UI benefits in order to quantitatively obtain an optimal UI program design. We first conduct an empirical analysis using the discontinuity of UI rules at state borders and find that both the monetary and the tenure requirement reduce unemployment. The monetary requirement decreases the ...
Working Paper
Robots, Tools, and Jobs: Evidence from Brazilian Labor Markets
What is the effect of robots and tools on employment and inequality? Using natural language processing and an instrumental variable approach, we discover that robots have led to a sizable decrease in the employment and wages of low-skill workers in operational occupations. However, tools — machines that complement labor — have led to an equally large reinstatement of these workers, increasing their employment and wages. Using a quantitative model, we find that the lower prices of robots and tools over the last 20 years have reduced inequality and increased welfare without a significant ...
Working Paper
Optimal Unemployment Insurance Requirements
In the U.S., workers must satisfy two requirements to receive unemployment insurance (UI): a tenure requirement of a minimum work spell and a monetary requirement of a past minimum earnings. Using discontinuity of UI rules at state borders, we find that the monetary requirement decreases the number of employers and the share of part-time workers, while the tenure requirement has the opposite effect. In a quantitative model, the monetary requirement induce workers to search longer because low paying jobs are not covered by UI. Since it mitigates moral hazard, the optimal UI design has a high ...
Working Paper
On Political and Economic Determinants of Redistribution: Economic Gains, Ideological Gains, or Institutions?
I describe a structural method to quantify the contribution of different elements of social choice to the level of redistribution. Estimating a DSGE model with microdata on the support for redistribution, I find that if voters disregarded their ideological views on welfare policies, redistribution in the U.S. would increase 117%. Because ideology is a more important determinant of voting behavior than income, increasing voter turnout or capping campaign contributions would have a small effect on redistribution. Among the drivers of ideology, I find that racial animosity and distrust of the ...