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Working Paper
Monetary policy frameworks and indicators for the Federal Reserve in the 1920s
The 1920s and 1930s saw the Fed reject a state-of-the-art empirical policy framework for a logically defective one. Consisting of a quantity theoretic analysis of the business cycle, the former framework featured the money stock, price level, and real interest rates as policy indicators. By contrast, the Fed?s procyclical needs-of-trade, or real bills, framework stressed such policy guides as market nominal interest rates, volume of member bank borrowing, and type and amount of commercial paper eligible for rediscount at the central bank. The start of the Great Depression put these rival sets ...
Journal Article
Perils of price deflations: an analysis of the Great Depression
If a central bank adopted a zero inflation target, it would, in practice, occasionally deviate up and down from that rate, and the economy would experience episodes of mild inflation and deflation. Is deflation-a decrease in the level of prices-a cause for concern? Deflation can cause output to decline, but to what extent? This Economic Commentary explores how much of a problem deflation might be for modern economies by estimating the effect of massive price declines on output during the Great Depression. The authors find that while deflation can cause output to decline, mild episodes of ...
Working Paper
Re-Examining the Role of Sticky Wages in the U.S. Great Contraction: A Multisectoral Approach
We quantify the role of contractionary monetary shocks and nominal wage rigidities in the U.S. Great Contraction. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we find that the average economy-wide real wage varied little over 1929?33, although real wages rose significantly in some industries. Using a two-sector model with intermediates and nominal wage rigidities in one sector, we find that contractionary monetary shocks can account for only a quarter of the fall in GDP, and as little as a fifth at the trough. Intermediate linkages play a key role, as the output decline in our benchmark is roughly ...
Report
Re-examining the contributions of money and banking shocks to the U.S. Great Depression
This paper quantitatively evaluates the hypothesis that deflation can account for much of the Great Depression (1929?33). We examine two popular explanations of the Depression: (1) The ?high wage? story, according to which deflation, combined with imperfectly flexible wages, raised real wages and reduced employment and output. (2) The ?bank failure? story, according to which deflationary money shocks contributed to bank failures and to a reduction in the efficiency of financial intermediation, which in turn reduced lending and output. We evaluate these stories using general equilibrium ...
Working Paper
Money, sticky wages, and the Great Depression
This paper examines the ability of a simple stylized general equilibrium model that incorporates nominal wage rigidity to explain the magnitude and persistence of the Great Depression in the United States. The impulses to our analysis are money supply shocks. The Taylor contracts model is surprisingly successful in accounting for the behavior of major macroaggregates and real wages during the downturn phase of the Depression, i.e., from 1929:3 through mid-1933. Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that a monetary contraction operating through a sticky wage channel played a ...
Newsletter
Then and now: Fed policy actions during the great depression and great recession
Although the recent Great Recession was severe, its financial impact never paralleled that of the Great Depression. The November Newsletter compares these two economic downturns and shows how lessons learned in the Great Depression helped current Federal Reserve policymakers stabilize the economy during the recent economic crisis.
Working Paper
Monetary policy in the Great Depression and beyond: the sources of the Fed's inflation bias
The deflationary outcome of monetary policy during the Great Depression had two fundamental causes: 1) the Federal Reserve's use of flawed operating guides, and 2) a decision to make preservation of the gold standard the overriding objective of policy. The Great Depression resulted in lasting changes in the domestic and international monetary regime that substantially weakened the gold standard, increased political control of monetary policy, and created new opportunities to monetize government debt, all of which gave monetary policy an inflation bias. Uncorrected flaws in the Federal Reserve ...