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Keywords:Deposit insurance 

Working Paper
Alligators in the swamp: the impact of derivatives on the financial performance of depository institutions

It has been argued that underpriced federal deposit insurance provides incentive for insured institutions to increase the value of shareholder equity by expanding into activities that shift risk onto the deposit insurer. Derivative instruments have been used by firms to change their risk exposure. Permitting firms with substantial moral hazard incentives to utilize interest-rate derivative instruments could lead to higher rather than lower exposure to risk. This article, using a sample of savings and loan associations (S&Ls), examines the proposition that involvement with interest-rate ...
Working Paper Series, Issues in Financial Regulation , Paper WP-96-6

Conference Paper
A theory of optimal forbearance

Proceedings , Paper 422

Journal Article
The too-big-to-fail problem: uninsured bank depositors must be uninsured

The Region , Volume 11 , Issue Sep , Pages 26-27

Journal Article
Ex ante risk and ex post collapse of S&Ls in the 1980s

Economic Perspectives , Volume 16 , Issue Jul

Journal Article
Deposit insurance reform

In the cover story, find out why some bankers are encouraging Congress to raise the ceiling for insurance on deposits to $130,000 from $100,000 per account. Opponents point out that in the wake of the last increase, the S&L crisis occurred.
The Regional Economist , Issue Oct. , Pages 4-9

Working Paper
Which banks choose deposit insurance? Evidence of adverse and moral hazard in a voluntary insurance system

The sharp increase in depository institution failures in recent years has drawn attention to the moral hazard created by under-priced deposit insurance. To identify possible reforms, researchers have begun to consider alternative deposit insurance arrangements. This paper contributes to that literature by examining the deposit insurance system of Kansas, which operated from 1909 to 1929. The Kansas system had a number of regulations that were intended to limit risk-taking, and membership was made voluntary to assuage objections that insurance forces conservative banks to protect depositors of ...
Working Papers , Paper 1991-005

Journal Article
Restoring banking's safety net: deposit insurance's steeper cost

A recession now in its 21st month has presented tremendous challenges to the deposit insurance system. Actual and expected bank failures have left the Deposit Insurance Fund below its mandated level. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has responded by raising the premiums banks pay. Premiums will rise for banks in the Dallas-based Eleventh Federal Reserve District--but not by as much as they will for banks in the rest of the country. This additional cost is an important consideration because every dollar spent on insurance is a dollar that can't be lent or otherwise invested.
Southwest Economy , Issue Q3 , Pages 16-19

Journal Article
Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity

This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances ...
Quarterly Review , Volume 24 , Issue Win , Pages 14-23

Report
Agency problems and risk taking at banks

The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value--a firm's profit-generating potential--as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and find ...
Research Paper , Paper 9709

Working Paper
Banking reform

Working Papers , Paper 9004

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