Search Results
Working Paper
A Model of Endogenous Debt Maturity with Heterogeneous Beliefs
This paper studies optimal debt maturity in an economy with repayment enforcement frictions and investors disagree about repayment probabilities. The optimal debt maturity choice is a mix of long- and short-term debt securities. Spreading risky debt claims on cash flows over time allows debt to be priced by investors most willing to hold risk at each point in time, thereby increasing investment and output. By contrast, a single maturity, either all long- or short-term, will be priced by investors less willing to hold risk, which reduces investment and output. The model provides a novel ...
Discussion Paper
Counterparty and Collateral Policies of Central Bank Lending Facilities
In a previous post, we compared the Federal Reserve’s discount window with the standing lending facilities (SLFs) at the Bank of England (BoE), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Bank of Japan (BoJ). We showed that the Fed’s discount window was less integrated with monetary policy than the SLFs of the other central banks. In this post, we observe that the counterparty and collateral policies of the Fed’s discount window are similarly less integrated with the practices involved in monetary policy operations, in comparison with the other central banks.
Working Paper
Safe Collateral, Arm's-Length Credit : Evidence from the Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Market
When collateral is safe, there are less opportunities for things to go wrong. We examine matching between collateral and creditors in the commercial real estate mortgage market by comparing loans in commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduits and bank portfolios. We model CMBS financing as lower cost but less informed, such that only safe collateral is funded by CMBS. This prediction is tested using the 2007-2009 shutdown of the CMBS market as a natural experiment. The loans funded by banks that would have been securitized are less likely to default or be renegotiated, indicating ...
Working Paper
Collateralized Debt Networks with Lender Default
The Lehman Brothers' 2008 bankruptcy spread losses to its counterparties even when Lehman was a lender of cash, because collateral for that lending was tied up in the bankruptcy process. I study the implications of such lender default using a general equilibrium network model featuring endogenous leverage, endogenous asset prices, and endogenous network formation. The multiplex graph model has two channels of contagion: a counterparty channel of contagion and a price channel of contagion through endogenous collateral price. Borrowers diversify their lenders because of the counterparty risk, ...
Working Paper
What Drives U.S. Treasury Re-use?
We study what drives the re-use of U.S. Treasury securities in the financial system. Using confidential supervisory data, we estimate the degree of collateral re-use at the dealer level through their collateral multiplier : the ratio between a dealer's secured funding and their outright holdings. We find that Treasury re-use increases as the supply of available securities decreases, especially when supply declines due to Federal Reserve asset purchases. We also find that non-U.S. dealers' re-use increases when profits from intermediating cash are high, U.S. dealers' re-use increases when ...
Working Paper
Transparency and Collateral: The Design of CCPs' Loss Allocation Rules
This paper adopts a mechanism design approach to study optimal clearing arrangements for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by two types of agents: a borrower and lender. The borrower is subject to limited commitment and holds private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. The lender can acquire information at a cost about the commitment of the borrower, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. When truthful revelation by the borrower is not incentive compatible, the ...
Working Paper
The (Unintended?) Consequences of the Largest Liquidity Injection Ever
The design of lender-of-last-resort interventions can exacerbate the bank-sovereign nexus. During sovereign crises, central bank provision of long-term liquidity incentivizes banks to purchase high yield eligible collateral securities matching the maturity of the central bank loans. Using unique security level data, we find that the European Central Bank's 3-year Long-Term Refinancing Operation caused Portuguese banks to purchase short-term domestic government bonds, equivalent to 10.6% of amounts outstanding, and pledge them to obtain central bank liquidity. The steepening of Eurozone ...
Working Paper
The Collateral Premium and Levered Safe-Asset Production
Banks are vital suppliers of money-like safe assets, which they produce by issuing short-term liabilities and pledging collateral. But their ability to create safe assets varies over time as leverage constraints fluctuate. I present a model to describe private safe-asset production when intermediaries face leverage constraints. I measure bank leverage constraints using bank-intermediated basis trades. The collateral premium — a strategy long Treasuries used more often as repo collateral and short Treasuries used less often — has a positive expected return of 22 basis points per ...
Working Paper
Contagion in Debt and Collateral Markets
This paper investigates contagion in financial networks through both debt and collateral markets. We find that the role of collateral is mitigating counterparty exposures and reducing contagion but has a phase transition property. Contagion can change dramatically depending on the amount of collateral relative to the debt exposures. When there is an abundance of collateral (leverage is low), then collateral can fully cover debt exposures, and the network structure does not matter. When there is an adequate amount of collateral (leverage is moderate), then collateral can mitigate counterparty ...
Report
Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?
In January 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton organized a bailout for Mexico that imposed penalty interest rates and induced the Mexican government to reduce its debt, ending the debt crisis. Can the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund) organize similar bailouts for the troubled countries in the Eurozone? Our analysis suggests that debt levels are so high that bailouts with penalty interest rates could induce the Eurozone governments to default rather than reduce their debt. A resumption of economic growth is one of the few ways that the Eurozone ...