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Working Paper
Debt Deflation Effects of Monetary Policy
This paper assesses the role that monetary policy plays in the decision to default using a General Equilibrium model with collateralized loans, trade in fiat money and production. Long-term nominal loans are backed by collateral, the value of which depends on monetary policy. The decision to default is endogenous and depends on the relative value of the collateral to face value of the loan. Default results in foreclosure, higher borrowing costs, inefficient investment and a decrease in total output. We show that pre-crisis contractionary monetary policy interacts with Fisherian debt-deflation ...
Conference Paper
Procyclicality and the New Basel Accord: banks' choice of loan rating system
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is proposing to introduce, in 2005, new risk-based requirements for internationally active (and other significant) banks. These will replace the relatively risk-invariant requirements in the current Accord. This article examines the implications of these new risk-based requirements for procyclicality, in particular whether the choice of particular loan rating system by the banks would significantly increase the likelihood of sharp increases in capital requirements in recessions, creating the potential for classic credit crunches. The paper finds that ...
Working Paper
Optimal Bank Regulation in the Presence of Credit and Run Risk
We modify the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model of banking to jointly study various regulations in the presence of credit and run risk. Banks choose between liquid and illiquid assets on the asset side, and between deposits and equity on the liability side. The endogenously determined asset portfolio and capital structure interact to support credit extension, as well as to provide liquidity and risk-sharing services to the real economy. Our modifications create wedges in the asset and liability mix between the private equilibrium and a social planner's equilibrium. Correcting these distortions ...
Working Paper
On Default and Uniqueness of Monetary Equilibria
We examine the role that credit risk in the central bank's monetary operations plays in the determination of the equilibrium price level and allocations. Our model features trade in fiat money, real assets and a monetary authority which injects money into the economy through short-term and long-term loans to agents. Short-term loans are riskless, but long-term loans are collateralized by a portfolio of real assets and are subject to credit risk. The private monetary wealth of individuals is zero, i.e., there is no outside money. When there is no default in equilibrium, there is indeterminacy. ...