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Report
Agency problems and risk taking at banks
The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value--a firm's profit-generating potential--as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and find ...
Report
The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes, consequences, and the implications for the future
This article designs a framework for evaluating the causes, consequences, and future implications of financial services industry consolidation, reviews the extant research literature within the context of this framework (over 250 references), and suggests fruitful avenues for future research. The evidence is consistent with increases in market power from some types of consolidation; improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvements on average; relatively little effect on the availability of services to small customers; potential ...
Journal Article
Securitization, loan sales, and the credit slowdown
Household and business lending has slowed sharply in recent years, but the anemic growth in loans booked at depository institutions, mortgage companies, and finance companies may overstate the decline in credit originated by these institutions. This article reports measures of credit growth that include "off-balance-sheet lending"loans that were originated by intermediaries but are absent from their balance sheets because of direct loan sales or the issuance of asset-backed securities. The authors also compare the relative volume of off-balance-sheet lending by types of intermediaries.
Report
Diversification, size, and risk at bank holding companies
This paper shows that large BHCs are better diversified than small BHCs based on market measures of diversification. We find, however, that better diversification does not translate into reductions in overall risk. The risk reducing potential of diversification at large BHCs is offset by their lower capital ratios, larger C&I loan portfolios, and greater use of derivatives. Our results suggest that asset growth should enhance diversification but that the effects on risk will depend on the extent to which growth is accompanied by changes in portfolio attributes. Using data from 1980 to 1993, ...
Report
Bank loan sales: a new look at the motivations for secondary market activity
Bank lending traditionally involves the extension of credit that is held by the originating bank until maturity. Loan sales allow banks to deviate from this pattern by transferring loans in part or in their entirety from their own books to those of another institution. This paper uses a new methodology to test the validity of two hypotheses regarding banks' motivations for selling and buying loans: (1) the comparative advantage hypothesis, that banks with a comparative advantage in originating loans sell and those with a comparative advantage in funding loans buy, and (2) the diversification ...
Working Paper
The consolidation of the financial services industry: causes, consequences, and implications for the future
This article designs a framework for evaluating the causes, consequences, and future implications of financial consolidation, reviews the extant research literature within the context of this framework (over 250 references), and suggests fruitful avenues for future research. The evidence is consistent with increases in market power from some types of consolidation; improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvements; relatively little effect on the availability of services to small customers; potential improvements in payments system ...
Journal Article
Banks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of franchise value
As protectors of the safety and soundness of the banking system, banking supervisors are responsible for keeping banks' risk taking in check. The authors explain that franchise value--the present value of the stream of profits that a firm is expected to earn as a going concern--makes the supervisor's job easier by reducing banks' incentives to take risks. The authors explore the relationship between franchise value and risk taking from 1986 to 1994 using both balance-sheet data and stock returns. They find that banks with high franchise value operate more safely than those with low franchise ...
Report
Agency problems and risk taking at banks
The moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance generates the potential for excessive risk taking on the part of bank owners. The banking literature identifies franchise value -- a firm?s profit-generating potential -- as one force mitigating that risk taking. We argue that in the presence of owner/manager agency problems, managerial risk aversion may also offset the excessive risk taking that stems from moral hazard. Empirical models of bank risk tend to focus either on the disciplinary role of franchise value or on owner/manager agency problems. We estimate a unified model and ...